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ABSTRACT 
Many states currently do not have an intelligence fusion center, and therefore, 
their ability to prevent and deter a terrorist attack is limited by the lack of information 
sharing.  Wisconsin in addition to many states lacks a central hub for information 
exchange and currently has no system in place that allows the variety of technologies to 
gain access to a common database to gather and/or exchange information.  The vast 
majority of public safety agencies currently operate their own systems that are incapable 
of exchanging information.  The inability to exchange and/or access information in user-
friendly format has inhibited many state and local efforts to keep its citizens safe from the 
possibility of a terrorist attack.   
The ultimate goal is to provide a mechanism where law enforcement , public 
safety and private sector partners can come together with a common purpose and improve 
the ability to safeguard our homeland and prevent criminal activity.  Terrorism Early 
Warning Systems (TEW’s) embody the core of collaboration and are an effective tool to 
maximize available resources and build trusted relationships.  The fusion process should 
be organized and coordinated on a statewide level between the major Urban Area 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Many states currently do not have an intelligence fusion center, and as a 
consequence, their ability to prevent and deter a terrorist attack is limited by the lack of 
information sharing. Wisconsin not unlike many states, lacks a central hub for 
information exchange and currently has no system in place that allows the variety of 
technologies to gain access to a common database to gather and/or exchange information.  
The vast majority of public safety agencies currently operate their own systems that are 
incapable of exchanging information.  The inability to exchange and/or access 
information in user friendly format has inhibited many state and local efforts to keep its 
citizens safe from the possibility of a terrorist attack.  How can information sharing be 
improved? 
Intelligence fusion centers and terrorism early warning systems provide an 
opportunity for states and locals to break down the informational silos created by 
historical legal and bureaucratic impediments to information sharing.  The intelligence 
reform efforts continuously underway at the federal level are contributing to an 
atmosphere that encourages information sharing.  However, states must also be key 
leaders in this area.  State and local leaders are positioned to mobilize state homeland 
security resources and design truly integrated information sharing networks.   
States planning to implement a statewide fusion center should learn from those 
states that have already set up and are operating intelligence fusion centers.  A fusion 
center is a physical location where officials receive, process, and analyze all-source 
information and synthesize their analyses into intelligence products for dissemination to 
relevant agencies and officials. Fusion centers can also serve as primary mechanisms for 
information sharing at the state and local levels. Fusion center analysts process and 
analyze information from state and local public safety agencies. The center shares it with 
relevant federal, state, or local agencies. Fusion centers also process information from 
federal sources, determines its relevance within the state or local jurisdiction, and 
disseminates it as necessary.  
 xvi
The failure to communicate and share vital information can also hinder 
investigations.  More than one agency investigating a similar case and not sharing 
information will also lead to the failure of apprehending criminal behavior prior to an 
incident.  In addition, many criminal investigations can have a terrorism nexus.  For 
example, crimes such as dealing in counterfeit currency, credit card fraud, smuggling, 
and money laundering or trafficking in stolen or forged documents, narcotics trafficking 
and trafficking in stolen goods are undertaken by various terrorist groups in order to 
generate funding.  This makes it important to communicate in both directions across the 
organizational divisions between homeland security investigations and traditional 
criminal investigations. 
The failure to exchange information and to connect the dots helped produce the 
tragic events of 9/11.  The culture of information-sharing must be changed from “need to 
know” to “need to share.”  The government has a vast amount of information and without 
a system in place for people to access data there can only be an extremely limited amount 
of information exchange. 
Fusion centers provide a clear link between local and federal public safety 
agencies. This enables fusion centers to coordinate interagency information sharing more 
effectively than could be done with the traditional approach. Fusion centers also take an 
all-source, multidisciplinary approach that facilitates the collection of information from a 
wide range of sources and perspectives.  Fusion centers and terrorism early warning 
centers can be structured differently and have different missions and some similar 
obstacles may have to be overcome through different methods.  Terrorism early warning 
centers need to be integrated with state intelligence fusion centers.  This creates an 
information sharing enterprise where information can flow from the local level up 
through the state to the federal government and flow from the federal level back down to 
the local level.  Information needs to be shared in order to effectively prevent terrorist 
attacks. 
The policy recommendation is to create an information sharing network.  This 
network will consist of a TEW in the city of Milwaukee linked to a statewide fusion 
center in Madison, Wisconsin.  The state fusion center should have direct access to the 
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National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and Homeland Security Operations Center 
(HSOC).  The information sharing network will be tapped into the national intelligence 
community so that the state can leverage national intelligence.  Personnel and analysts 
assigned to the Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center should have access to the many 
different databases that store a variety of information.  This data could be obtained 
through a secure porthole allowing the user to log onto one secure porthole and access 
information from many databases.  
An optimum local information sharing network in Wisconsin would have 
personnel from the following agencies assigned to the statewide fusion center, this list 
would include:  
• Wisconsin State Patrol 
• Milwaukee Police Department 
• Madison Police Department 
• Dane County Sheriff’s Office 
• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
• Milwaukee Fire Department 
• Madison Fire Department 
• USDHS Border Patrol 
• USDHS Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation 
• U.S. Secret Service 
• U.S. Postal inspection Service 
• Wisconsin Department of Corrections 
• Wisconsin Department of Public Health (DHFS) 
• Wisconsin Department of Agriculture 
• Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
• Wisconsin Attorney General Office 
• Wisconsin Department of Military Affairs 
• USDHS Intelligence & Analysis 
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Wisconsin and additional states that have fusion centers or those that are in the 
conceptual stage for a statewide intelligence center and/or a local TEW should reach out 
to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and become partners in 
information sharing.  Milwaukee, Wisconsin has a HIDTA office and they should be 
integrated into the information sharing network.  The HIDTA program provides 
additional federal resources to those areas to help eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and 
its harmful consequences. Law enforcement organizations within HIDTA’s assess drug 
trafficking problems and design specific initiatives to reduce or eliminate the production, 
manufacture, transportation, distribution and chronic use of illegal drugs and money 
laundering.  One of the key priorities of the Program is to assess regional drug threats and 
facilitate coordination between federal, state and local efforts; to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of drug control efforts to reduce or eliminate the harmful 
impact of drug trafficking. 
The development and exchange of intelligence is not easy.  Information sharing 
not only requires strong leadership; it also requires the commitment, dedication and trust 
of a diverse group of men and women that agree in the power of collaboration.  The 
ultimate goal is to provide a mechanism where law enforcement, public safety and private 
sector partners can come together with a common purpose and improve the ability to 
safeguard our homeland, state and prevent criminal activity.  TEWs embody the core of 
collaboration and as resources decrease, TEWs will become even more of an effective 
tool to maximize available resources and build trusted relationships.  The fusion process 
should be organized and coordinated on a statewide level between the major urban 
(UASI) areas and the statewide fusion center concept and integrate information sharing 





I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Many states currently do not have an intelligence fusion center, and as a 
consequence, their ability to prevent and deter a terrorist attack is limited by the lack of 
information sharing. Many states lack a central hub for information exchange and 
currently have no system in place that allows the variety of technologies to gain access to 
a common database to gather and/or exchange information.  In Wisconsin not unlike most 
states, the vast majority of public safety agencies currently operate their own systems that 
are incapable of exchanging information.  The inability to exchange and/or access 
information in user friendly format has inhibited Wisconsin’s efforts to keep its citizens 
safe from the possibility of a terrorist attack.  For example, currently a traffic patrol 
officer in Wisconsin cannot gain access to the Department of Corrections database to 
search for pertinent information that may be relevant to an investigation.  In addition, 
local authorities do not have access to Interpol in order to check on the status of an 
immigrant. 
The inability to exchange information in real time makes it less likely that 
suspects operating in a terrorist capacity will be apprehended.  A variety of law 
enforcement agencies conduct investigations on a regular basis.  The vast majority of 
them do not know, nor have the ability to identify what the other is doing.  The current 
patrol officer is unable to access information in case management databases because their 
operating systems are mutually exclusive and incompatible with one another.  There is no 
secure gateway that allows local first responders and law enforcement to access local 
records management systems.  Vital information stored within such records management 
systems is vital to conducting an investigation.  In addition, the lack of ability to access 
such information allows for the failure to connect the dots.  Currently there is no legal 
issue with sharing such information.  The problem lies with the failure to have an 
information sharing network in place that allows for law enforcement to access the 
information. 
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Mohamed Atta was stopped for speeding and issued a warning when there was a 
warrant for his arrest.  Failure to have access to this information prevented police from 
detaining him.1  The failure to communicate and share vital information can also hinder 
investigations.  More than one agency investigating a similar case and not sharing 
information will also lead to the failure of apprehending criminal behavior prior to an 
incident.  In addition, many criminal investigations can have a terrorism nexus.  For 
example, crimes such as dealing in counterfeit currency, credit card fraud, smuggling, 
and money laundering or trafficking in stolen or forged documents, narcotics trafficking 
and trafficking in stolen goods are undertaken by various terrorist groups in order to 
generate funding.  This makes it important to communicate in both directions across the 
organizational divisions between homeland security investigations and traditional 
criminal investigations. 
The failure to exchange information and to connect the dots helped produce the 
tragic events of 9/11.  The culture of information-sharing must be changed from “need to 
know” to “need to share.”  The government has a vast amount of information and without 
a system in place for people to access data there can only be an extremely limited amount 
of information exchange.2 
The criminal justice system in Wisconsin is a loosely connected community of 
independent agencies.   There are over 600 independent law enforcement agencies within 
the state.  Most of the state's law enforcement agencies are small and do not have staff 
dedicated to intelligence functions.  Officers in these smaller, local agencies interact with 
the community daily, but presently lack the tools and resources necessary for developing, 
gathering, accessing, receiving, and sharing intelligence information. 
To successfully deploy a statewide information sharing solution, members of this 
diverse community must be actively involved in articulation of a collective vision. 
Representation of all parties must be involved in defining the scope and objectives of the 
solution.  Key concerns involve establishing an effective organizational structure, 
                                                 
1 Susan Candiotti, "Another Hijacker was stopped for a Traffic Violation," CNN.com, January 9, 2002, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/01/09/inv.hijacker.traffic.stops (accessed  October 12, 2005). 
2 Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton, The 911 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon The United States, 2004), 417. 
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securing funds, developing comprehensive and detailed strategic and tactical plans while 
addressing a host of technical and policy issues.  To successfully integrate all 
stakeholders, Wisconsin must accommodate the disparate information systems already in 
place and strategies must accommodate a wide-range of information privacy and system 
security considerations.  Compliance with federal requirements concerning intelligence 
data bases and privacy laws will be a key concern for information sharing. 
A program and capability review conducted, evaluated Wisconsin’s information 
sharing capability and found that the state is currently served by four major systems in 
various stages of development:  the Health Alert Network (HAN), the State Emergency 
Management GIS System, the Justice Gateway, and the Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence 
Center (WSIC).  Each of these systems has been designed to fulfill a specialized role and 
serve a different group of stakeholders.  Nevertheless, the state recognizes the danger of 
having information silos that are unable to communicate.  It is therefore vital to develop a 
state intelligence and information sharing structure and plan to ensure that as these 
systems continue to grow, they grow in a way that allows them to share necessary 
information.  An information sharing network will connect to other response disciplines 
through the Wisconsin Justice Gateway, the Health Alert Network (HAN), the state 
Emergency Operations Center (EOC), fusion center, Milwaukee urban area early warning 
system and existing state systems. An intelligence fusion center will also provide non-law 
enforcement intelligence bulletins to the public safety community across the state. 
A recent incident will highlight the potential of the need for information sharing 
to decrease, mitigate and respond to risks: 
On November 22, 2005 an explosive device was discovered in a downtown 
Madison parking ramp, heavily used by city, county and state employees.  The 
Improvised explosive Device (IED) was fortunately rendered safe by the Dane County 
Bomb Squad. The process was repeated the very next day and the devices were described 
by law enforcement as "unstable and extremely deadly."  Multiple agencies at the federal, 
state and local levels were involved in the investigation of these related incidents. 
Madison Police Department had a description of a late model dark Honda with a partial 
license plate number suspected of being involved.  Requesting assistance from the 
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Division of Motor Vehicles, investigators received it in the way of four large envelopes 
containing thousands of pages with over 60,000 possibilities.  This required weeks and 
hundreds of hours of staff time to sort through and follow up on the leads. In the midst of 
the investigation, on Christmas Eve, another explosive device in the same parking 
structure was detonated, injuring one person and destroying a car.  Fortunately, again, the 
injuries were minor.  As late as January 12, 2006, Madison was again plagued by threats 
of suspicious objects being placed around downtown, effectively shutting down much of 
the area. 
Decreased, mitigated risk is directly associated with the availability of public 
safety officials to make better informed decisions. These decisions are based on accurate, 
timely and actionable information. Had the investigators been able to quickly analyze and 
sort through the information, it is entirely plausible to extrapolate an outcome that would 
not have included any further incidents.  The bottom line is the potential to disrupt, deter, 
or mitigate an act of terrorism or a simple criminal action through the sharing of 
information is the most basic action government can take to protect its citizens.  The 
amount of information currently shared electronically is staggeringly low; here is an 
opportunity to help remedy the situation.  We must endeavor to provide law enforcement 
officers with more complete information about potential suspects.  Providing statewide 
access to the hundreds of thousands of defendants , aliases, and case information the 
state's many criminal justice databases is a necessary step in protecting the public from 
potential terrorist threats.  Without this access, law enforcement could miss another 
opportunity to stop a terrorist before the attack is carried out.  Chapter III provides 
additional examples including 2 case studies that support the need for Wisconsin to create 
an information sharing network.   
The fusion center will be the state's primary and central distribution center for 
information and intelligence sharing functions amongst emergency services. When 
completed, the fusion center will be a hub for all major information systems and link 
them across disciplines to assure seamless flows of information.  The statewide fusion 
center will also be inter-linked with a Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW) in the 
most populated area in the state, Milwaukee. 
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While an information sharing plan is being developed, Wisconsin should continue 
to support the development of these systems as they increase functionality and serve ever 
larger numbers of responders.  This policy recommendation will expand the information 
sharing network to fulfill the needs and demands of emergency service partners and 
private sector stakeholders.  The network’s mission will be to develop strong links across 
multi-agency and multi-disciplined programs.  While the statewide fusion center will 
operate with a primary focus on homeland defense issues, it will work in the background 
to support all intelligence and information sharing in the state. Information will flow 
vertically and horizontally into the center from federal sources as well as from state, 
local, tribal and private sector sources.  Intelligence will be shared across multi-
disciplines through systems such as the Wisconsin Justice Gateway, the Health Alert 
Network and the Emergency Operation Center (EOC) when required. 
 
B. SPECIFIC RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this thesis is to identify steps that collectively will comprise a 
model that can be used as a template for statewide information sharing.  The expectation 
is that through information sharing, public safety agencies can better protect the safety of 
citizens and ultimately assist in the terrorism prevention efforts. 
This thesis will study a variety of alternatives to help Wisconsin and other states 
in preventing potential terrorist attacks through building an information sharing 
enterprise.  It also will identify an effective method that can be used to design a statewide 
strategy for information sharing and put forth specific steps required in order to establish 
an intelligence fusion center and information-sharing network.  Specific solutions will be 
identified based on research, case studies, and best practices from around the country that 
will put Wisconsin in the forefront of terrorism prevention through information sharing. 
This thesis will address two policy options: creating a Terrorism Early Warning 
Center (TEW) based on the Los Angeles TEW or the creation of a statewide intelligence 
fusion center coupled with an information sharing enterprise that interlinks the City of 
Milwaukee TEW system to the fusion center.  The latter option would provide for a 
statewide information sharing capacity.  Building this capability would enable Wisconsin 
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to work proactively and uniformly in the prevention and deterrence of terrorism.  An 
urban area TEW will not fully enhance statewide capability in information sharing.  Only 
a statewide central hub would be able to disseminate information throughout the state. 
Wisconsin law enforcement officials and homeland security authorities have 
determined that information-sharing needs to be improved in order to better protect and 
serve the public.  The intelligence community must enhance its capacity to obtain 
intelligence relevant to protecting the homeland.  The U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security advises this must include local, state as well as federal agencies working 
together to provide real time actionable information.3  Lack of a means to properly 
collect, analyze and disseminate information and the difficulty in current operating 
systems to access data bases is as a weakness in the prevention of terrorism. 
Information sharing using current technology through the use of a statewide 
intelligence fusion center could substantially reduce the potential of a terrorist attack.  
Implementation of an information sharing enterprise could potentially allow law 
enforcement authorities to prevent a terrorist attack by putting together pieces of 
information from multiple sources and disseminating that intelligence to the proper 
public safety officials.  The recommendation or model could be used as a template 
nationwide, expanding existing policy and strategy options for information sharing by 
other jurisdictions. 
 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Based on preliminary research, it appears that the concept of intelligence fusion 
has begun to emerge as the fundamental process to facilitate the sharing of homeland 
security information and intelligence at the national level.  That being said, it is then 
imperative that this must become the guiding principle in an individual state initiative to 
prevent terrorism.  The objective of the research is to link information in a manner that 
will facilitate an operational design of a system to allow for information sharing 
throughout the public safety community.  According to the Heritage Foundation, state 
and local representation in the Intelligence Community would greatly facilitate this 
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, 
http://whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/index/html/ (accessed September 4, 2005). 
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mission by bringing unique perspectives and needs to the process of creating a usable, 
integrated intelligence picture.4  Fusion centers, which are collaborative efforts to 
combine and analyze anti-terrorism information from multiple sources, have become 
increasingly popular as part of homeland security and overall strategies in the prevention 
of terrorism.  A number of states, including Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, 
Maryland, Massachusetts and New York, currently operate so-called fusion centers, and 
many more states, such as Missouri, are considering doing so.  The problem with so 
many states approaching this task from different perspectives is that there is currently a 
lack of protocols regarding connectivity between centers and different levels of 
government.5 Therefore, minimum guidelines need to be recognized for establishing and 
operating intelligence fusion centers. 
The components of this proposed information sharing network include 1) the 
practical need for the system, 2) which specific type of system would be optimal, 3) 
which data bases will be queried & compatible, 4) the method of transmission, 5) the 
dissemination of intelligence and 6) the uses of such a system in preventing a terrorist 
attack. 
Lt John Sullivan, of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, is considered 
to be one of the nation’s leading experts in information-sharing through the use of 
terrorism early warning centers.  According to Sullivan effective and rapid dissemination 
of indications and warnings to local emergency response agencies is an essential yet 
problematic element of terrorism management efforts in the United States.  A TEW 
should consist of a multilateral, multidisciplinary effort to monitor open source data to 
identify trends and potential threats, monitor specific threat information during periods of 
heightened concern, assess potential targets, and perform net assessments to guide 
decision-making during actual events.6  The TEW embraces a networked approach and 
there is no single entity in charge. Public safety entities collaboratively work together as a 
network. A particular agency may take the lead and coordinate the process to make sure 
                                                 
4 James J. Carafano, “Terrorist Intelligence Centers Need Reform Now,” The Heritage Foundation, 
2004, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em930.cfm/ (accessed November 15, 2005). 
5 Alice Lipowicz, “Justice Issues Fusion Center Guidelines,” 2005, Washington Technology, 
http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/1_1_/daily_news/26893-1.html. (accessed October 26, 2005). 
6 John Sullivan, e-mail message to Author, November 19, 2005. 
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notifications are made, and the right people are linked together. The TEW brings together 
law enforcement, fire, health, and emergency management, because those are the 
operators that are going to manage these responses in the field. The underlying principles 
to close the information gap, with the fire service, emergency management discipline and 
the health community. While these disciplines do not need to know criminal information, 
the TEW can get the information they need to them with a real emphasis on force 
protection and protecting the responders so that an event can be mitigated.   
The TEW in Los Angeles monitors trends and assesses threats that could result in 
terrorist attacks in Los Angeles County. Currently, members of the TEW evaluate media 
accounts, information from other Federal, State, and local agencies, and other open-
source data to determine the information’s credibility. As part of its assessment, the TEW 
identifies terrorism precursor events so that prevention and mitigation efforts can be 
undertaken.  The role of the TEW in a crisis is to provide intelligence and support to 
incident commanders and give recommendations that assist in the decision making 
process.7  The Los Angeles model also incorporates a Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) to 
assist in the sharing of information.  This network of Terrorism Liaison Officers gives the 
TEW the ability to communicate effectively and efficiently.  In addition, TLOs have the 
ability to provide local information from their agencies to the TEW.8 
The TEW model also incorporates the Red Team concept.  Those assigned to the 
TEW form a small active risk assessment group that regularly conducts vulnerability risk 
assessments to critical infrastructure within their jurisdiction.  The assessments are used 
by the team to create “playbooks” that are designed to assist first responders in a response 
to a terrorist attack.9  The L.A. TEW has amassed a huge library of resources that will 
assist them in a coordinated response to a terrorist attack. 
                                                 
7 Office of State and Local Coordination and Preparedness, “Terrorism Early Warning Group,” 2005, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TEWBrochure.pdf. (accessed November 17, 2005). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Greg Krikorian, “Terrorism Early Warning Group Works to Keep L.A.'s Guard Up,” Los Angeles 
Times, 2004, 
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The fusion center concept is to serve as conduit between the federal and local 
government.  The ability to receive information through a single source from the federal 
government has been a long time complaint of local government.  William Welsh writes 
that local government officials are overwhelmed with terrorist alert information and 
intelligence.  The locals need to continue to design systems that allow for a single 
primary conduit to gather and disseminate information.10  State fusion centers will allow 
the locals the flexibility to have specific intelligence requirements and receive 
information from a single source and point of contact.   
The Office of Domestic Preparedness has made strengthening information sharing 
and collaboration capabilities a national priority.  Incorporated into the new priority 
capabilities is both information sharing and dissemination, and law enforcement 
investigation and operations.  One of the federal goals of this national priority is to 
strengthen information sharing from the federal level to the state and local level through 
the homeland security information network.11  Information sharing is categorized under 
prevention, one of the four critical mission areas that the Office of Domestic 
Preparedness has identified. 
Mark Lowenthal writes that intelligence exists solely to support policymakers and 
that policymakers have a constant need for tailored, timely intelligence that will provide 
background, context, information, warning and assessment of risks, benefits and likely 
outcomes.12  Information is constantly being collected and shared on a daily basis from 
numerous public safety entities around the country on a local level.  Decisions are being 
made expeditiously by trained individuals assigned to work in fusion centers and TEWs. 
In order to effectively share information there has to be a process put into place.  
There needs to be a central storage house of locally gathered threat and other terrorism 
related information that is gathered.  There also must be a clear process for analyzing and 
dissemination of relevant information. The integration of justice systems and information 
                                                 
10 William Walsh, Fusion Forward, 2005, 
http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/20_4/statelocal/25616-1.html. (accessed November 30, 
2005). 
11 Office of Domestic Preparedness, 2006 Homeland Security Grant Program,  
http://ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs.fy2006hsgp.pdf. (accessed December 29, 2005). 
12 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2003), 3. 
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sharing is not a new idea.  Agencies throughout the nation have long recognized the 
importance of integrating information systems to share critical data prior to key decisions 
having been made.  Nearly every state in the nation is actively planning or implementing 
integrated justice information systems.13  The U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
and the U.S. Department of Justice has recognized the importance of integrated systems 
strategic planning and coordination and is allowing federal funding to support such 
initiatives.  New initiatives bring forth new issues and information sharing through 
integration of data bases raised important legal, constitutional and policy issues that must 
be addressed.  Integration and sharing of information between law enforcement agencies 
with other governmental agencies, and with the general public raises new and important 
privacy and confidential issues that also must be addressed.14    
According to the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), the OJP information sharing 
advisory committee to the Assistant Attorney General was created to facilitate and 
support the exchange of justice information.  The advisory committee recommends that 
any approach to information sharing must take into account the safety of the general 
public and current justice processes including the sensitivity to balance complex issues 
such as; the balance between the need to share information to keep the public safe and the 
need to secure and control access to information.15  States have the responsibility to build 
a statewide information repository that supports the operational intelligence needs of state 
and local public safety agencies.  States playing a lead role will need to develop standards 
consistent with national standards to enable the sharing of information between local 
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D. TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
This thesis will study alternatives to help Wisconsin in preventing a possible 
terrorist attack through building an information sharing enterprise as well as protocols for 
inter-state communication between fusion centers.  One solution would be to support a 
Terrorism Early Warning Center (TEW) in Milwaukee.  Milwaukee is the most highly 
populated urban area in Wisconsin and generates the greatest amount of intelligence.  
A second option is to create a statewide information sharing enterprise supported 
by an intelligence fusion center.  The statewide fusion center will serve as a central hub 
for information gathering, fusion and dissemination.  The President’s Executive Order 
dated August 27, 2004 requires the strengthening of the intelligence community.  There is 
a need for the establishment of interface standards for an interoperable information 
sharing enterprise that facilitates the automated sharing of intelligence information 
among agencies within the Intelligence Community.16  A TEW needs to interface with a 
fusion center on the state level in order to facilitate such an endeavor. 
Fusion centers embody the concept of collaboration. Collaboration allows 
agencies to maximize available resources and work jointly toward a common goal.  
Centers should plan for future connectivity using current technology and adhere to certain 
standards.17  Basic standards such as the use of extensive markup language (XML) would 
allow networks to communicate with one another.  
A fusion center with statewide capabilities, interconnected with a TEW located in 
Milwaukee will provide for redundancy and backup capabilities if something should 
happen to either site.  A state fusion center allows for interconnectivity to the state 
emergency operations center and the Department of Military Affairs Joint operations 
Center.  A state fusion center also shows leadership on behalf of the state to the locals 
and will provide a conduit to the National Intelligence Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).  
A local TEW in the city of Milwaukee will allow for greater resources to be used in the  
                                                 
16 President George W. Bush, "Executive Order: Strengthened Management of the Intelligence 
Community," August 27, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-6.html. 
(accessed September 15, 2005). 
17 Peter A. Modaferri, "Intelligence Sharing: Efforts to Develop Fusion Center Intelligence Standards," 
Police Chief 72, no. 2 (February 2005): 25. 
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most urban and vulnerable city in the state of Wisconsin.  Working in a collaborative 
effort, the TEW and state fusion center will cover the needs of the state, both urban and 
rural.  
 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLGY 
Information sharing has already been shown to be a productive method of solving 
and preventing complex problems and crimes.  If current technology can accommodate 
an information sharing enterprise that will allow the public safety community to 
communicate, share information in real time and allow access to data, then society as a 
whole should be safer from a potential terrorist attack. 
This research will consist of a literature review of current information regarding 
the most accurate information sharing methods and mechanisms to achieve information-
sharing capabilities.  The review will include a brief history of intelligence, the 
intelligence cycle, the dissemination of information, and the culture of “need to know” 
and how that impacts this project.  In addition, the technology necessary and business 
requirements needed to be successful in creating an information sharing network will be 
addressed.  
Interviews with intelligence experts, who have implemented information sharing 
capabilities through the use of fusion centers and terrorism early warning centers, as well 
as interviews and personal experiences regarding failures in exchanging information in 
real time will provide direct insight how this directly affects the safety of the community. 
Unfortunately at this point in the development of our homeland security efforts, 
definitive standards have yet to be established for intelligence fusion centers.  Specific 
case studies of the LA Terrorism Early Warning System and the Illinois Fusion Center 
will effectively allow for measurement of the success of fusion centers because it can be 
shown that the fusion process and capabilities of information sharing has proven to be 
successful. 
While it is difficult to measure prevention, the tangible evaluation of outcomes 
and impact of a program, case studies can yield strong indications of success.  In  
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addition, the 9/11 report offers substantial analysis into the failures of the intelligence 
community and the inability to connect the dots because of a lack of policy in place to 
permit agencies to do so.  
 
F. THE NEED FOR INFORMATION SHARING 
Since September 11, 2001, federal, state, and city governments have established 
initiatives to improve the sharing of information to prevent terrorism. Many of these 
initiatives were implemented by states and cities and not necessarily coordinated with 
other sharing initiatives, including those by federal agencies. At the same time, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has initiatives under way to enhance 
information sharing.  Overall, there should be enterprise architecture, to integrate sharing 
between federal, state, and city authorities.  
Terrorism poses an imminent and grave threat to our nation. Hostile groups are 
continuing to plan attacks in this country and abroad. To prevent terrorism to the greatest 
extent possible and to swiftly punish it when it occurs, the government must have 
adequate legal authorities and must develop a strong organizational structure. Improved 
intelligence collection and better sharing of information are central to success.  
Information sharing will be effective only if it is managed well, with some entity having 
clear responsibility for setting standards and ensuring implementation and it takes full 
advantage of available technology, which can be leveraged both to facilitate appropriate 
information sharing and to protect privacy. 
The only way to prevent terrorist attacks is to gather intelligence. It is to collect 
the information that reveals who the terrorists are, who is backing them with money and 
resources, and where they are likely to strike.  Policymakers must go further to build a 
new intelligence system to support transformed national security needs. Threats involving 
unknown perpetrators, methods, and targets cannot be countered with strategies designed 
for use by federal officials to combat more predictable adversaries. Today, state and local 
law enforcement, public health, and emergency response personnel are on the front lines 
of detecting and responding to terrorist threats; corporate managers are responsible for  
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securing key infrastructure such as energy supplies, chemical plants, and 
telecommunications; and workers and neighborhood residents may hold information that 
can help prevent attacks.  
Cold war intelligence policies were aimed to protect sources and methods and 
keep adversaries from gaining access to military secrets. To achieve these goals, defense 
and intelligence agencies compartmentalized acquisition, analysis, and dissemination of 
information, an approach that worked reasonably well as long as policymakers knew who 
the enemy was, what information to look for, where to look for it, and who needed to 
have it. Analysts became specialists and information was shared among carefully defined 
groups of federal officials and contractors who were specified in advance and who held 
appropriate security clearances based on lengthy, costly background investigations. 
These policies are ill-suited to the challenge of counterterrorism. Their dual 
requirements of appropriate security clearance and "need to know" designation inhibit the 
free flow of information to and from today's diverse community of relevant federal, state, 
local, and private sector actors. 
It is impossible to anticipate "need to know" in a world where enemies are little 
understood, means of attack are unpredictable, and potential targets are many, diverse, 
and changing. The need for intelligence, to gather information about threats and 
vulnerabilities from state and local governments and the private sector and return needed 
information to them, creates a heightened government responsibility to protect core 
values of openness and privacy.  Policymakers must build a new intelligence system to 
fight terrorism. The formal, hierarchical, and compartmentalized information strategies of 
the past need to be replaced with a new architecture featuring flexible, decentralized 
networks of public and private information providers, analysts, and users. Policymakers 
should establish procedures to assure access to critical information needed to address 







Espionage, counterintelligence, and covert action have been important tools of 
U.S. political leaders since the founding of our nation.  During the Revolutionary War, 
General George Washington directed a broad range of clandestine operations that helped 
the colonies win independence.  Washington ran networks of agents and double agents, 
employed deceptions against the British army, launched sabotage operations and 
paramilitary raids, used codes and ciphers, and disseminated propaganda and 
disinformation to influence foreign governments.  America's founders all agreed with 
General Washington that there was a necessity of procuring good intelligence.  In a letter 
written to one of his officers in 1777, Washington wrote: 
The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need not be 
Further urged-All that remains for me to add is, that you keep the whole 
matter as secret as possible.  For upon secrecy, success depends in most 
enterprises of the kind & for want of it, they are generally defeated, 
however well planned.... [letter to Colonel Elias Dayton, 26 July 1777]18 
 
A. HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE SHARING 
Presidents in the early Republic were actively involved in intelligence activities 
especially covert actions.  In his first State of the Union message, Washington requested 
that Congress establish a secret service fund for clandestine activities. Within two years 
the fund represented over ten percent of the federal budget.  Thomas Jefferson drew on it 
to finance the United State's first covert attempt to topple a foreign government, one of 
the Barbary Pirate States, in 1804-05. It failed.  James Madison employed agents of 
influence and clandestine paramilitary forces in trying to acquire territory in the Florida 
region from Spain during 1810-12. Several presidents dispatched undercover agents on 
espionage missions overseas.  One spy, disguised as a Turk, obtained a copy of a treaty 
between the Ottoman Empire and France. Also during this period, Congress first tried to 
exercise oversight of the secret fund, but President James K. Polk rebuffed the lawmakers 
and thought that the experience of every nation on earth has demonstrated that 
                                                 
18 Provost Phyllis McNeil, The Evolution of the U.S. Intelligence Community, ed. Loch K. Johnson 
and James J Wirtz (Los Angeles: Roxbury Publishing Company, 2004), 5. 
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emergencies may arise in which it becomes absolutely necessary to make expenditures, 
the very object of which would be defeated by publicity.19 
The first organized intelligence capabilities were implemented by the military.  
The U.S. Navy established the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882.  The Army 
soon followed and created the Division of Military Information (DMI) in 1885.  By 1939 
there were several more governmental agencies that had intelligence units such as the 
Agriculture, Commerce and Interior Departments.20  Each intelligence unit had its own 
operations, methods, ambitions and secrets and operated in a world of its own. 
Due to a lack of collaboration between intelligence units from various 
governmental agencies a central information clearing house was needed.  President 
Truman recognized the need for a centralized intelligence system.  Taking into account 
the views of the military services, the State Department, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), he established the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 
1946.  The CIG had two missions: providing strategic warning and conducting 
clandestine activities.  The CIG functioned under the direction of a National Intelligence 
Authority composed of a Presidential representative and the Secretaries of State, War and 
Navy.  Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, USNR, who was the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Intelligence, was appointed the first Director of Central Intelligence (DCI).21 
Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, which became 
effective on 18 December 1947 the National Security Council (NSC) and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) were created.  The 1947 Act charged the CIA with 
coordinating the nation's intelligence activities and correlating, evaluating, and 
disseminating intelligence which affects national security.  In addition, the Agency was to 
perform other duties and functions related to intelligence as the NSC might direct.  The 
Act defined the DCI's authority as head of the Intelligence Community, head of the CIA, 
and principal intelligence adviser to the President, and made him responsible for 
protecting intelligence sources and methods.  The act also prohibited the CIA from 
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engaging in law enforcement activity and restricted its internal security functions.  The 
CIA carries out its responsibilities subject to various directives and controls by the 
President and the NSC.22  It is clear that the inability of the CIA to effectively collaborate 
and share information with the FBI and other federal entities, created an intelligence 
stove pipe.  
Throughout history our nation has utilized intelligence gathering and covert 
operations in an effort to keep the homeland safe and to be effective during wartime.  
During that time there were several occasions when intelligence collection and the 
process of fusing information came into question.  During the Vietnam War concerns 
grew that policymakers were pressuring the intelligence community to provide 
information that would be supportive of policy.  Policymakers and the intelligence 
community were never at more odds than during the order of the battle debate, which 
focused on the number of enemy units that were in the field.23  The opposing views on 
what constituted enemy units lead to a breakdown in intelligence communications. 
There have been complete failures in the history of the intelligence community.  
All the capabilities and intelligence collection capacity available at that time did not 
prevent the Emperor of Japan form successfully attacking Pearl Harbor.  The ultimate 
failure in intelligence came on September 11, 2001.  The 9/11 attack on the Trade Towers 
has often been compared to that of the Japanese against Pearl Harbor as another infamous 
case of intelligence failure. On both occasions, there was ample evidence that the enemy 
might be pushed to undertake a desperate act. But the signs leading up to 9/11 were 
ignored for at least three of the same reasons that the Japanese were able to catch the U.S. 
Pacific fleet at anchor on the morning of 7 December, 1941.  Good intelligence indicators 
lost in the noise of disinformation; a belief that the enemy lacked the technical capacity to 
undertake the action; finally, mirror imaging, the assumption on the part of the 
intelligence consumer that the action undertaken was unlikely because it was illogical. 
While in retrospect the footprint of a surprise attack becomes easy to trace, before 
the event it usually requires a great effort of foresight and intuition to cull out good 
                                                 
22 Lowenthal, Intelligence,  18-19. 
23 Ibid., 21-22. 
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information from a plethora of data. Relevant information may be filtered out as it is sent 
up the bureaucratic chain because it seems unimportant, trivial or irrelevant to more 
important concerns, such as local FBI agents reporting that Arab students in flight 
schools only wished to learn how to take off, not to land.  Noise becomes a problem 
especially when intelligence services have overlapping mandates, are competitive and 
therefore fail to cooperate to share and analyze information, or believe that the other 
service has a special responsibility for the collection of a particular type of intelligence. It 
is now obvious that the inability of the CIA and the FBI to communicate at least 
contributed to the failure to detect the 9/11 attacks, as the failure of army and naval 
intelligence to cooperate aided the Pearl Harbor debacle.  Also, as noted above with 
respect to the Japanese attack, the fact that intelligence analysts could not conceive of the 
possibility of this type of threat because it didn’t make any sense to them.  If one can 
understand the mindset of a Jihadist, flying planes into buildings is a perfectly logical and 
desirable method to accomplish your goals, even though the rest of us just shake our 
heads in disbelief and cannot imagine what that could prove or how it could actually 
advance anyone’s political agenda.  Therefore, while stovepipping is unquestionably a 
major factor, understanding the mindset of the enemy has to be included as well.  Most 
intelligence and/or policy planning agencies have their “Red Team” people who dream 
up all sorts of exotic ways and means to carry out attacks.  Most of the time, people don’t 
take these scenarios seriously because they seem too much like fantasy or science fiction.  
Perhaps that approach has to be rethought.  Even so, that does not mean that every idea 
dreamed up by the Red Team has to be accepted.  It is their job to be creative.  Terrorists 
more often then not stick to their traditional methods of explosives and firearms and it 
would be a mistake to view terrorism solely through the lens of 9/11.   
A second factor in intelligence surprise occurs when the technological capabilities 
of the enemy are underestimated. The United States discounted the ability of the Japanese 
Navy to project a fleet across the Pacific to launch an air attack with aerial torpedoes 
against U.S. ships. Despite this successful precedent, the United States Navy persisted in 
its belief that the Japanese Navy was incapable of orchestrating such an operationally and 
technologically sophisticated maneuver. Ironically, although the 9/11 conspirators 
demonstrated an organizational capacity to coordinate the simultaneously hijacking of 
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four airliners, no one suspected that the hijackers' weapon of choice would be the box-
cutter.  In addition, as opposed to the Pearl Harbor example, the enemy not only used a 
combination of primitive, almost iron-age technology (what is in fact a knife), along with 
highly advanced technology (passenger aircraft) but perhaps more importantly, that the 
enemy used our technology against us – something that the Japanese did not have the 
desire or opportunity to do.  This, of course, has to do with the nature of terrorism as 
opposed to conventional war since terrorism springs up from within, as terrorists are too 
weak to field an army and navy against us.  Moreover, today’s society is more 
technology-intensive than was US society in the 1940s and this too is a factor that should 
be considered.  
The final cause of intelligence surprise is mirror-imaging, the belief that the 
perpetrators will not carry out a particular act because the defender, in their place, would 
not do it. It seemed inconceivable to the U.S. planners in 1941 that the Japanese would be 
so foolish to attack a power whose resources so exceeded those of Japan, thus virtually 
guaranteeing defeat.24 Likewise, the notion of suicide bombing is so alien to the 
American and Western outlook, that we find it difficult to fathom the mindset of enemies 
prepared to conceive of an operation of such horrific proportions, one in which they are 
prepared to immolate themselves in acts of fiery desperation. In fact, one interpretation of 
the events of 9/11 is that many of the hijackers did not realize that, by signing on to 
Osama bin Laden's desperate mission, they would be committing suicide. The fact that 
bin Laden and his henchmen were willing to use their own people in this way, if in fact 
some of the hijackers were unaware of the actual goals of the mission, gives us insights 
into their minds and what life would be like in bin Laden's world.  Their own people went 
to their deaths willingly; at the very least we can be sure that the terrorist pilots did so.  It 
is not just Bin Laden pulling the strings, it’s not a question of absolute blind loyalty to a 
leader; it is a question of fanatical religious belief. 
The attack on Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 terrorist attack on the World Trade 
Center are similar in the fact that there were major intelligence failures that may have 
prevented the event from happening.  An intelligence failure is any misunderstanding of a 
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situation that leads a government or its military forces to take actions that are 
inappropriate and counterproductive to its own interests.  It is a mistake to think that any 
human endeavor, including intelligence, will be error-free.  Enemies may be 
underestimated or overestimated, and events that should be predictable go unforeseen.  
Because intelligence work is the product of a team effort, there are certain peculiarities 
common to the bureaucratic environment that helps explain failure.  Arguably, the worst 
kind of intelligence failure is surprise attack.  
The case of Pearl Harbor is regarded as the worst case of intelligence failure in 
history.  No intelligence agency had prepared a report for the possibility of an attack 
there, although everyone talked about it.  Naval intelligence (ONI) did not even have a 
minimal amount of strategic or tactical intelligence.  They thought Japan would attack 
Thailand about that time of year.  The problem was that America lacked Human 
Intelligence (HUMINT) on Japan.  The U.S. had a few geisha girls on the payroll, but no 
agents in the Japanese elite.  The U.S. had broken the Japanese code, but what they were 
intercepting was just diplomatic and espionage information (movement of spies), nothing 
of the nature of military plans, and they changed their codes a day before the attack.  
Japanese radio transmissions deceived the Americans into thinking the task force was 
assembling for training maneuvers. 
Not sharing information and the failure to connect fragmented pieces of 
information into actionable intelligence are the primary factors in the failure to prevent 
9/11.  The 2004 Executive Summary of the 9-11 Commission Final Report stated that all 
the following were specific intelligence failures, which occurred: 
• Not watch listing future hijackers Hazmi and Mihdhar and not trailing 
them after they traveled to Bangkok  
• Not sharing information linking individuals in the Cole attack to Mihdhar  
• Not taking adequate steps in time to find Mihdhar or Hazmi in the United 
States  
• Not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui, described as interested in 
flight training for the purpose of using an airplane in a terrorist act, to the 
heightened indications of attack  
• Not discovering false statements on visa applications by the Hamburg cell  
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• Not recognizing passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner by the 
Hamburg cell  
• Not expanding no-fly lists to include names from terrorist watch lists  
• Not searching airline passengers identified by the computer-based CAPPS 
screening system  
• Not hardening aircraft cockpit doors or taking other measures to prepare 
for the possibility of suicide hijackings  
 
Unfortunately over time a wall had been built to separate criminal and intelligence 
investigations.  These separations lead to a lack of coordination in the intelligence 
community.  Most notably, there was a lack of sharing information between the FBI and 
the CIA.  The requirement to have some separation between criminal and intelligence 
investigations grew out of a 1980 case, United States v. Truong Dinh.25  One can point to 
the Reagan or Bush I administrations for when the Truong requirement took hold in the 
Department of Justice.  Some time in the 1980s, the exact moment is hidden in historical 
documentation; the Department applied the Truong analysis to an interpretation of the 
FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) statute.  This caused the failure to share 
information to strengthen between the FBI and CIA.  The Truong requirement for some 
separation between criminal and intelligence investigations does not mean complete 
isolation and the FBI through internal policy caused a failure in sharing information. 
 
B. THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS 
The intelligence cycle in the civilian arena, is the process of developing raw 
information into finished intelligence for consumers, including policymakers, law 
enforcement executives, investigators, and patrol officers. These consumers then use this 
finished intelligence for decision making and action. Intelligence may be used, for 
example, to further an ongoing investigation, or to plan the allocation of resources.  The 
process is a five step process that includes decision making and feedback as part of the 
last step.  It is a continuous ongoing circular of activity as outline in the diagram below.26 
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Figure 1.   The Intelligence Cycle  
 
Planning and direction involves management of the entire intelligence effort, from 
identifying the need for data to delivering an intelligence product to a consumer. It is both 
the beginning and the end of the cycle. It is the beginning because it involves formulating 
specific collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination requirements. It is the end 
because finished intelligence, which must support decision-making and action, frequently 
generates new information requirements. 
The intelligence process is primarily consumer driven. That is, nearly the entire 
process depends on guidance from the consumer, the end user of the intelligence. 
Consumers from all levels of government, federal, state, and local may initiate requests 
for intelligence. In addition, policymakers, executives, investigators, and patrol officers 
usually have different information needs. Thus, the effective planning and direction of the 
intelligence effort requires an understanding of the needs of a variety of consumers.  
However, if the consumers do not know what to ask for because they don’t know what 












a disconnect.  If the process is exclusively consumer driven, this is a problem.  The best 
model would involve both inputs and requirements from consumers as well as having the 
intelligence community through out bits of information that it thinks might be of interest 
to various consumers and telling them, “if you’re interested, there’s more where that 
came from.”  That way, different types of information might be made available to 
consumers who were unaware of them earlier and may then expand the scope of the types 
of information that consumers might need. 
Collection is the gathering and reporting of the raw information that is needed to 
produce finished intelligence. To be effective, collection should be planned, focused, and 
directed. There are many sources of raw information, including open sources such as 
governmental public records, media reports, the Internet, periodicals, and books. 
Although often underestimated, open source collection is important to an intelligence 
unit's analytical capabilities. There are also confidential sources of information. Law 
enforcement officers collect such information from various sources, including citizens 
who report crime, investigations that are conducted, and speaking with persons who 
participate in criminal activity. To gather this information, law enforcement officers use a 
variety of collection methods such as interviews, undercover work, and physical or 
electronic surveillance. 
Processing involves conversion of raw information into a form usable by analysts. 
This is accomplished through information management. Information management is the 
indexing, sorting, and organizing of raw data into files so that the information can be 
rapidly retrieved. The processing step includes entry of data into a computer, reduction of 
data, collation of paper files, and other forms of information management. Effective 
processing requires an understanding of the consumers' needs, the types of information 
that are being processed, the collection plan, and the analytic strategy.  
Analysis and production is the conversion of basic information from all sources 
into finished intelligence. It includes integrating, evaluating, and analyzing all available 
data, which is often fragmentary and even contradictory and preparing intelligence 
products. Analysis gives additional meaning to the raw information. Analysts, who are 
subject-matter specialists, consider the information's reliability, validity, timeliness, and 
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relevance. They integrate data into a coherent whole, put the evaluated information in 
context, and produce finished intelligence that includes assessments of events and 
judgments about the implications of the information for consumers. 
Intelligence and analysis units may devote their resources to producing strategic 
intelligence for policymakers and executives, providing operational intelligence to 
continuing investigations, or making available tactical intelligence for an immediate law 
enforcement need. These important functions are performed by monitoring current crime 
and non-crime events, warning decision makers about actual and potential threats to 
public safety and order, and forecasting developments in the area of criminal activity. 
Intelligence and analysis units may produce numerous written reports, which may be 
brief, one page or less or lengthy studies. They may involve current intelligence, which is 
of immediate importance, or long-range assessments. The Agency presents some finished 
intelligence in oral briefings. 
The last step, which logically feeds into the first, is the distribution of the finished 
intelligence to the consumers, the same consumers whose needs initiated the intelligence 
requirements. These recipients of finished intelligence then make decisions or take action 
based on the intelligence that has been provided. This step should also include an 
opportunity for feedback, to assess the value of the intelligence that has been provided.27 
The decisions, actions, and feedback may lead to the levying of more information 
requirements, thus triggering the intelligence cycle once again. 
 
C. NEED TO KNOW VS. NEED TO SHARE 
One of the most important needed changes for the intelligence community is 
cultural.  The U.S. intelligence community remains handicapped by internal barriers and 
walls meant to protect intelligence sources and methods.  While the need-to-know 
principle cannot be completely discarded, the intelligence paradigm must shift from a 
need-to-know to a need-to-share because no single intelligence analyst or agency has a 
monopoly on knowing everything or being right all the time about the various terrorist 
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threats.  This means better communication and information-sharing, which requires an 
integrated information sharing network. 
Intelligence agencies typically compartmentalize their information, for the most 
part to protect it.  The federal intelligence agencies, spread through six Cabinet 
departments, must learn to share information on terrorism rather than stovepipping it.  
Had the CIA alerted the FBI sooner that key plotters of al Qaeda were in the U.S., or had 
the FBI shared its concerns about Middle Easterners taking flying lessons, the September 
11 attacks might have been foiled.  Establishing an intelligence sharing process that 
allows the locals and the federal government to exchange information is vital to 
preventing another attack to the homeland. 
The National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) is designed to be a central 
location where all terrorist-related intelligence, both foreign and domestic, is gathered, 
coordinated, and assessed. It is composed of elements of the FBI, CIA, Department of 
Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, and other intelligence 
agencies. According to the Administration, the NCTC will: 
• Optimize the use of terrorist threat-related information, expertise, and 
capabilities to conduct threat analysis and inform collection strategies;  
• Create a structure that ensures information sharing across agency lines;  
• Integrate terrorist-related information collected domestically and abroad in 
order to form the most comprehensive threat picture possible; and  
• Provide terrorist threat assessments for the national leadership.28 
The original Terrorism Threat Integration Center (TTIC) prior to NCTC had 
developed a secure Web site to provide access to top-secret information to government 
officials from all agencies involved in the war against terrorism.  It will soon have a Web 
site with secret and law enforcement sensitive information that will give access to a much 
broader community of analysts. Eventually, online capabilities will have sensitive but 
unclassified information that will allow more information sharing with state and local 
officials and the private sector.29  Currently, the Director of the NCTC reports directly to 
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29 John Brennan, Terrorist Threat Integration Center, "Our First Line of Defense for Homeland 
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September 23, 2003. 
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the Director of National Intelligence.  This is part of the new beginning in changing the 
old adage need to know vs. need to share information.  State intelligence fusion centers 
and Terrorism Early Warning Systems play an imperative role in the exchanging of 
information. 
 
D. COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION 
 
Intelligence and information sharing for the purpose of preventing, preparing 
for, and responding to potential terrorist attacks on the United States; the responsibility 
of the Department of Homeland Security for comprehensive, nationwide, terrorism-
related threat, vulnerability, and risk analyses; the integration, analysis, and 
dissemination of homeland security information, communications of terrorism-related 
information by the federal government to State, local, and private sector entities; 
liaison of the Department of Homeland Security with U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies; information gathering, analysis, and sharing by Department of 
Homeland Security entities; the role of intelligence in threat prioritization; are vital in 
our Nation’s efforts against terrorism. 
 
Source: Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk Assessment 
 
 
The policy of the intelligence community should be that intelligence is produced 
in a way that balances the need for maximum utility of the information to the intended 
recipient with protection of intelligence sources and methods. The controls and 
procedures established by this directive should be applied uniformly in the dissemination 
and use of intelligence originated by all Intelligence Community components.  
Originators of classified intelligence information should write for the consumer. This is 
intended to provide for the optimum dissemination of timely, tailored intelligence to 
consumers in a form that allows use of the information to support all need to know 
customers.  The originator of intelligence is responsible for determining the appropriate 
level of protection prescribed by classification and dissemination policy. Originators shall 
take a risk management approach when preparing information for dissemination.  In the 
interest of the widest possible dissemination of information to consumers who need to 
know, classifiers should carefully consider the needs of all appropriate intelligence 
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consumers regarding sources and methods information or sensitive analytic comments 
and use tearlines and other formats to meet consumer needs for intelligence. 
Not everyone necessarily needs to have open access to intelligence information.  
Those that do need to go through the background investigation phase of the FBI in order 
to have clearance.  Part of the problem is that it currently takes to long to process the 
backgrounds and grant clearances.  There is no way around this requirement.  The 
backgrounds are designed to allow the government to assess whether a candidate is 
sufficiently trustworthy to be granted access to classified information. Applicants must 
meet certain criteria, relating to their honesty, character, integrity, reliability, judgment, 
mental health, and association with undesirable persons or foreign nationals.  The FBI is 
currently in charge of conducting backgrounds and attempt to complete them in 45-60 
days.  This may not always be the case and therein lays the problem.  The FBI must make 
the commitment to allocate enough resources to effectively complete security clearances 
with the set forth timeframe.  Our nation can ill afford to get bogged down in a process 
that prevents clearances from taking place. 
Chapter III looks at two separate information-sharing capabilities where 
coordination and collaboration is a key to success in preventing terrorist activity.  The 
intelligence fusion center concept is an entity that is involved with hard analytical fusion 
of information that produces intelligence that is pushed up to the federal level and pushed 
downward to local law enforcement and public safety agencies.  The terrorism early 
warning system is an information sharing entity that is utilized at the local level that 
brings together several individuals using a multidiscipline approach to sharing 
information.  The concept utilizes red teaming, conducts regular vulnerability 
assessments and plays a supportive role in a crisis.  The key is to interlink the two 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
There is a problem with information sharing and the ability to obtain and 
disseminate that information.  Creating an enterprise can help alleviate this problem.  An 
information sharing enterprise is a structure for directly linking together public safety 
agencies and entities to facilitate the flow of information and foster cooperation among 
them. In an information sharing enterprise, public safety agencies directly share 
terrorism-related information with each other. Officials from these agencies act as nodes 
within the enterprise, transmitting terrorism-related information from their own agency to 
local police and to other agencies for which this information would be relevant. There is a 
clearly established product line to cover the dissemination of information within the 
intelligence community.30  In an information sharing enterprise, law enforcement 
agencies and fusion centers do not serve as the single, centralized hubs for information 
management. However, they still play a vital role as nodes that are capable of producing 
and disseminating analyzed intelligence throughout the network.  
An information sharing enterprise requires more resources and manpower than 
other information sharing mechanisms. Public safety agencies must be willing to dedicate 
staff, either on a full- or part-time basis, to gather and disseminate information. 
Participating agencies must also be able to identify information that is relevant and be 
willing to share that information with appropriate local entities.  Several jurisdictions 
have established information sharing networks by adopting the Terrorism Early Warning 
Group (TEW) model such as Los Angeles County. TEWs are multidisciplinary networks 
that facilitate or perform all of the principal information and intelligence sharing 
functions at the local level.31  Currently Wisconsin does not have the capability, or the 
capacity to analyze information, fuse it into a workable product and share it effectively 
through proper dissemination.  The city of Milwaukee is the largest, most populated and 
vulnerable urban area in the state of Wisconsin.  Milwaukee needs to build its capabilities 
in order to effectively prevent terrorism through information sharing.  There is no central 
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clearinghouse for tips, investigative information and/or general open source information 
that enhances collaboration and the sharing of intelligence. 
In October 2004, the City of Oak Creek, a suburb of Milwaukee was subject to an 
intentional act of sabotage which resulted in the collapse of two separate power 
transmission towers.  The preliminary investigation revealed that an unknown suspect or 
suspects intentionally loosened and removed several bolts from the base of two power 
transmission towers.  The result was a disruption to train service and air service at 
Mitchell International Airport located in Milwaukee.  The FBI was immediately called in 
to assist in the investigation and terrorism has never been ruled out.32  Throughout the 
investigation more and more evidence had come forth that could have been provided 
prior to the incident and pieced together, had a TEW been in place.  Witnesses had 
observed a suspicious van in the area of the transmission towers and one had failed to 
report that activity and a second witness had reported it to local police who checked the 
area, but never followed up on the tip.33 A TEW would have enabled local patrol officers 
to forward suspicious information through the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program.  
A tipster line into the TEW would provide an opportunity for local citizens to report 
suspicious activity.  Different pieces of information and/or clues can be submitted to the 
TEW for analysis.  Information fused can provide intelligence to support investigations.  
The TEW interconnected to the statewide intelligence center would allow for the two 
entities to leverage resources and search multiple databases and effectively piece 
information together. Currently there is no one single source or warehouse of information 
in the most vulnerable urban area in Wisconsin.  A TEW would be the single point of 
contact for all information to come into and disseminate from.  The TLO program would 
train representatives from various public safety agencies and the private sector on what to 
look for regarding suspicious activity and what should be reported.  Currently in the 
Milwaukee area every agency is operating on their own individual server utilizing 
different software programs that are not compatible with one another and will not allow 
the exchange of data and/or information in real time. 
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33 Sgt. Mike Meyer, interview by Author, March 21, 2006. 
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Terrorism exercises conducted have repeatedly singled out the need for 
improvement in information sharing.  An exercise conducted on March 2, 2006 involved 
suspicious individuals as role players being stopped and questioned regarding their 
possible involvement in leaving a suspicious package outside of City Hall.  A routine 
records check indicated that they were who they said they were.  However, the local 
dispatch center not having access to additional data bases were unable to gather 
information from surrounding jurisdictions that the suspects had been questioned 
regarding the purchase of explosive chemicals commonly used in IEDs.  A TEW would 
have been able to pull the information together from searching multiple data bases.  A 
quick check with the statewide intelligence center would have lead to more information 
on the suspects.  The overarching concept is to pull information together from multiple 
sources to create intelligence that can be shared. 
 
A. LOS ANGELES TERRORISM EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
The LA TEW integrates criminal and operation intelligence to support strategic 
and tactical users.  As a part of this process the TEW seeks to identify emerging threats 
and provide early warning by integrating inputs and analysis from a multidisciplinary, 
interagency team.  Within a single TEW, this process is known as all source/all phase 
fusion, where intelligence is derived from all potential sources to include; classified, 
sensitive but unclassified and open sources or OSINT to provide information and 
decision support at all phases of a threat response.34  Information needed to understand an 
event is available from local through global sources. 
Identifying global distributed threats and achieving an understanding of their 
impact requires more than simple information sharing.  It demands collaborative 
information fusion and the production of intelligence among cooperative agencies that 
are distributed among locations where terrorist operate, plan, or seek to attack.  
Developing the intelligence needed to anticipate, prevent, disrupt, or mitigate the effects 
of an attack requires the production of intelligence in a collaborative and integrated 
endeavor by a number of agencies across this dispersed area. This is known as co-
production of intelligence. In essence the TEW is designed as a node in a counter-                                                 
34 John Sullivan, interview by Author, February 21, 2006. 
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terrorist intelligence network. To achieve this local through global fusion, or co-
production, the TEW has developed an organizational structure and processes, including 
Intelligence Preparation for Operations (IPO) and the Transaction Analysis Cycle; it 
conducts exercises, and is forming a networked framework for node-to-node 
collaboration.35  Organizationally, the TEW is organized into six cells: the Officer-in-
Charge or OIC - Command, Analysis/Synthesis, Consequence Management, 
Investigative Liaison, Epidemiological Intelligence (Epi-Intel) and Forensic Intelligence 
Support cells. The Forensic Intelligence Support cell, which includes technical means and 
such external resources as virtual reach back, supports the others.  These are supported by 
a network of Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) coordinated by the TEW.  The 
foundational TEW organization can be described as: 
• The OIC (Command) cell provides direction, sets intelligence 
requirements, and is responsible for interacting with the incident command 
entities. 
• The Analysis/Synthesis cell coordinates net assessment activities and 
develops an iterative collection plan (including tasking requests for 
information to the various net assessment elements). The 
Analysis/Synthesis cell is also responsible for developing the results of all 
the cells' analysis into actionable intelligence products. 
• The Consequence Management cell assesses the law, fire and health 
(EMS-Hospital-operational medical) consequences of the event. 
• The Investigative Liaison cell coordinates with criminal investigative 
entities and the traditional intelligence community. 
• The Epidemiological Intelligence (Epi-Intel) cell is responsible for real-
time disease surveillance and coordination with the disease investigation. 
• The Forensic Intelligence Support cell exploits a range of technical 
means of support the TEW fusion process. These include CBRNE 
reconnaissance, the use of sensors and detectors, geospatial tools 
(including mapping, imagery and GIS products), and cyber means.36 
 
The TEW has developed a local network of Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLOs) at 
each law enforcement, fire service, and health agency in its area of operations.  In 
addition, private sector counterparts, known as infrastructure Liaison Officers (ILOs) are 
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36 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Terrorism Early Warning Group, 2005. 
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also being established to ensure the flow of information between the TEW and key critical 
infrastructure and cultural entities. TLOs and ILOs provide the outer sensing capacity for 
the TEW and are users of TEW products.37  The LA TEW model has a proven record of 
being successful in the prevention of terrorism in both real life threats and through 
terrorism prevention exercises.  The Terrorism Early Warning Group (TEWG) Functional 
Exercise, conducted on Tuesday, August 30, 2005 in Los Angeles, California, was the 
thirteenth in a series of 39 exercises to be conducted as part of Operation Chimera – 2005 
Los Angeles County Operational Area (OA) Exercise Program. The exercise proved to be 
very successful, bringing together highly skilled representatives from the TEW cadre, the 
Los Angeles County Department of Health Services Acute Communicable Disease 
Control (ACDC) program, the DHS Technical Advisory Group (TAG) and the TEW 
Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) program to test the challenges presented by an 
aerosolized anthrax release.38 
Throughout the exercise, it was recognized that the TEW was able to identify, 
validate and appropriately disseminate the various pieces of intelligence generated during 
the course of the exercise. During the course of the exercise, members of the 
Analysis/Synthesis Cell effectively vetted leads and showed restraint on releasing 
information that could not be confirmed.39  Cells within the TEW provided support to 
one another by exchanging information throughout the exercise and the Epidemiological 
Intelligence (Epi-Intel) Cell became fully integrated with the Analysis/Synthesis Cell 
following the presumptive identification of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax).  
Financing terrorism has evolved over time and the terrorist will help support their 
network and activities by any criminal means.  In 2002 U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) seized a container filled with counterfeit shampoos, creams, colognes 
and perfumes along with eight tons of fake Vaseline jelly, sent by a member of Al Qaeda.  
The LA TEW played a significant role in piecing together information and providing 
intelligence to policy makers.  There have been several instances where the TEW has 
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39 Ibid. 
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played a supportive role in counterfeiting investigations in California where arrest have 
been made and suspects have had ties to Hezbollah.40  
The LA TEW played a significant role in fusing information and providing 
valuable intelligence that thwarted a terrorist attack at Disneyland.  A videotape was 
received that contained a creditable threat of a Sarin gas attack at Disneyland.  The LA 
TEW conducted the initial analysis of the tape and the initial investigation that lead to 
preventing the attack from taking place.41 (Further information detailing the success of 
this event is classified). 
The TEW model is scalable and adaptable.  Co-production of intelligence to 
counter the evolving terrorist threat requires the development of multilateral structures.  
Much of the information necessary to understand the dynamics of a threat, or even to 
recognize that a threat even exist is developed from the bottom up as well as through 
horizontal structures as opposed to top down structures.  Multilateral exchanges of 
information including indicators of potential attacks and alliances among networked 
criminal actors are needed to counter networked adversaries.  This requires the 
development of new analytical processes and policy.  The TEW model and the processes 
evolving within the TEW network are the first step in the pursuit of preventing another 
attack on our nation’s homeland. 
 
B. ILLINOIS STATEWIDE INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTER 
Intelligence analysis and production is the merging of data and information for the 
purpose of analyzing, linking, and disseminating timely and actionable intelligence with 
an emphasis on the larger public safety and homeland security threat picture.  Intelligence 
information sharing and dissemination capabilities are necessary tools to enable efficient 
prevention, protection, response and recovery activities.  Simply put the goal of a fusion 
center is to get the right information, to the right people, at the right time. 
The Illinois Statewide Terrorism Intelligence Center (STIC) is a joint initiative 
between the Illinois State Police and the Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police, in 
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concert with their partners in the criminal justice community.  The original proposal was 
developed in response to a commonly-voiced complaint by law enforcement agencies 
regarding the absence of a centralized intelligence-sharing mechanism for terrorism- 
related information in Illinois.  The STIC was designed to serve as a one-stop resource 
for Illinois' criminal justice agencies for both domestic and international terrorism-related 
information.  The STIC coordinates the exchange of information between local police 
officers and agents assigned to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force to ensure the 
appropriate persons are linked, eliminating the bureaucratic frustration of being 
transferred from one person or agency until the proper assistance is located.  The 
overarching concept is deceivingly simple: hire, train, and staff a pool of analysts to 
provide a broad spectrum of terrorism-oriented intelligence and analytical resources to 
law enforcement officers in Illinois.  Specific goals for STIC are:  
• To supply 24-hour, seven-day-a-week access for terrorism-oriented 
intelligence queries for all law enforcement agencies throughout the state, 
providing a focal point for both state and federal database inquiries.  
• Maintain a centralized repository to capture incoming query data which 
will be analyzed and assessed; these assessments are provided to law 
enforcement agencies throughout Illinois as well as to the Illinois 
Emergency Management Agency.  
• To facilitate a strong working relationship between local police officers 
and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces.  
• To act as police liaison with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency 
for predictive consequence management resource allocation.  
• To serve as a national model for multi-agency, anti-terrorism intelligence 
initiatives.  
• Included in the initiative is the use of an extranet server which will enable 
secure, password-protected access by any law enforcement officer or 
criminal justice agency to terrorism intelligence documents and STIC 
reports via a web-based format.  
• In addition to a repository for query data, the STIC database will be used 
as a pointer system for terrorist-based investigative referrals between 
agencies to promote direct interagency intelligence-sharing 
opportunities.42 
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The STIC is located in Springfield, Illinois in the newly opened State Emergency 
Operations Center, a state-of-the art facility that will help the state better protect Illinois 
residents by bringing key terrorism prevention and emergency response assets together in 
one location.  The center will enable decision makers from several state agencies to 
receive timely, disaster related information that will help them make better decisions to 
respond to emergencies and to help protect the public in the event of an act of terrorism 
or a natural disaster.  The STIC opened in 2003 with a primary focus on analyzing 
terrorism related intelligence.  Since then it has incorporated units specializing in other 
categories of criminal activity, including narcotics, violent crimes, sex offenses and 
motor vehicle theft.  STIC analysts specialize in certain areas of critical infrastructure: 
water, electricity, telecommunications, etc.., and some have skills in foreign languages 
including Arabic and Urdu.  Coordinators from each unit and representatives from the 
command staff make up a Threat Integration Group (TIG) that meets daily to review and 
analyze the activity reported during the previous 24 hours.  The TIG provides feedback to 
the field officers and other state level decision makers.  The center is linked to the Illinois 
State Police Office of Counter Terrorism, which has 14 representatives on two FBI Joint 
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF).  That link ensures that leads identified at the STIC are 
followed up by JTTF and that the STIC is aware of the task forces’ investigations.  In 
addition, the STIC includes an infrastructure security awareness program that links 
analysts with the security chiefs of major corporations in the state, offering an effective 
information sharing pathway among state and federal officials and the private sector. 
The STIC operates three shifts 24/7 and allow for one half hour overlap on each 
shift for shift change briefing.  Each analyst known as Terrorism Research Specialist 
receives a minimum of 150 hours of training.  This instruction  consist of 61 hours of 
database training, 69 hours of classroom and practical training and 20 hours of in-service 
which consist of specialized topics.  The STIC utilizes several state agency databases for 
gathering information in addition to private such as Lexis-Nexis.  They have access to 
LEO; Law Enforcement Online, which is maintained by the FBI and access to Interpol.  
The scope of the STIC intelligence operations is tactical intelligence support.  Law 
enforcement agencies can request information directly from the field.  For request from 
the field with an ongoing law enforcement activity, the STIC attempts to within a 15 
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minute timeframe, check their principle intelligence database and the Chicago law 
enforcement automated directives and their online reports database as well as place phone 
calls to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) where several federal databases are 
checked for information regarding a specific individual.  Additional queries are made 
through the FBI Chicago and/or Springfield office. 
The information is captured on an incoming data collection form that later serves 
as the principle reporting format for dissemination to the requester, and becomes the 
foundation for the in-house intelligence file.  Field request take top priority over 
additional STIC intelligence activities and the goal is to provide the requestor with initial 
information to either confirm or deny a known terrorism nexus.  Upon completion of the 
15-minute run-up period, routine intelligence follow-up and additional research occurs 
and ultimately leads to an entry into the STIC’s main database. 
The STIC also receives non-urgent requests from various law enforcement and 
homeland security entities.  This includes simple requests for information (RFIs) through 
the JRIES system, a nationwide internet message system managed by the Department of 
Defense and Department of Homeland Security that is being implemented in all 50 states.  
These calls are process similarly, but do not demand the quick turn around as a field 
request. 
The STIC also provides strategic intelligence support.  The support functions are 
divided into three primary functions: (1) Groups/Methods/Targets; each analyst is 
assigned a certain number of domestic/international terrorist groups; (2) terrorism 
methodologies and (3) infrastructure targets to continually monitor, collect intelligence 
on and assess.  This effort leads to formal threat and vulnerability assessments; Special 
Projects and Data Fusion.  The fusion process is based on a 24 hour period.  Currently the 
STIC captures, analyzes, documents and stores data from a variety of sources to include: 
incoming intelligence postings from other agencies(between 30 and 40 each day), media 
news reports, official bulletins/alerts/ be on the lookout (BOLOS) (i.e., FBI weekly 
bulletin), requests and/or incident reports forwarded directly to STIC, JRIES postings, 
and other known threat activity. This information is then noted directly on the three shift 
reports done throughout the 24 hour cycle. Based on the type/relevance of the incoming 
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information, further intelligence analysis may occur. Notable information is then 
presented and disseminated on both the daily intelligence notes and the internal daily 
command briefing. Other periodic incident analysis and/or reporting occur as required. 
The other side of information management is information sharing.  One of the 
principle missions of STIC is to serve as an information clearinghouse or central 
repository for all terrorism-related information that comes through the center. The STIC 
accomplishes this by utilizing a series of internal computer-networked files categorized 
as administrative, groups (domestic and international), methods, targets (infrastructure), 
threats (both suspicious incidents with a possible terrorism nexus, and threats to public 
officials for the Executive Protection Unit), requests, research, STIC intelligence 
products (reports, alerts, summaries, BOLO’s, etc.), and mapping.  All intelligence work 
done by the STIC is maintained in one of these electronic files, and all qualified 
intelligence is entered into the STIC database. 
In addition, the STIC uses two secure Web pages within the Illinois Technology 
Office (ITO) website at www.ito.state.il.us.  Law enforcement officials are granted access 
to the STIC site, which is a repository of law enforcement sensitive information. Civilian 
corporate security and consequence management entities are granted access to the shared 
zone site. The STIC also publishes via email distribution a daily intelligence notes for 
law enforcement and homeland security organizations. For internal command recipients, 
the STIC compiles a daily command briefing which features data fusion over a 24 hour 
period.  The STIC also shares all request information with either the FBI Chicago or 
Springfield JTTF, depending on jurisdiction boundaries. Information is also sent through 
the Illinois Wireless Information Network (IWIN) to officers in the field. 
Information collection is governed by 28 CFR Part 23 and more or less underlies 
all activities of the fusion center.  Information that is terrorism related is maintained by 
the center.  If a review of information determines that additional investigation is 
warranted, officials will begin documenting the use of that information, as required by 
regulation.  The files are purged every 24 months, although information relating to 
ongoing investigations is retained. 
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C. INTEGRATING STRATEGIES 
Administration and congressional efforts to reorganize national security 
intelligence have focused mainly on reducing barriers to sharing information among 
federal agencies, improving federal information technology capabilities, coordinating 
analysis of federal and local law enforcement and intelligence data, and supporting state 
and local emergency communication. Around the country, newly expanded joint 
terrorism task forces bring together federal and local law enforcement officials. Terrorism 
investigators more easily combine law enforcement and intelligence data as permitted by 
the USA PATRIOT Act, which Congress passed soon after the terrorist attacks. Federal 
airport security officers conduct more rigorous screening of passengers under the terms of 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, enacted two months after the attacks. The 
Department of Homeland Security, charged with coordinating domestic intelligence 
gathering and information sharing, has begun collecting data about vulnerabilities in the 
nation's critical infrastructure. A new National Counter Terrorism Center, under the 
supervision of the director of central intelligence, is in charge of synthesizing 
counterterrorism intelligence from all sources. 
Concerns have arisen about conflicts with government openness, especially when 
secrecy has been expanded without public debate.  Many of these actions could be 
considered as emergency measures, extraordinary steps to counter extraordinary threats. 
They represent important building blocks for a new generation of intelligence policy.  
More security issues that affect openness and privacy will be decided in the future. The 
administration will determine if additional rules are needed to shield sensitive but 
unclassified information from public view, which might include scientific research, law 
enforcement records, or infrastructure vulnerability reports. Policymakers have to define 
policies and procedures for information sharing. 
Defending against terrorism threats will require policymakers to replace the 
formal, hierarchical intelligence structure with a horizontal, cooperative, and fluid 
architecture that gets information from those who have it to those who need it through the 
development of virtual communities of information sources, analysts, and users. Hard-
wiring intelligence relationships when actors, methods, and targets are uncertain impair 
our ability to adapt to changing threats and vulnerabilities. 
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Advances in information technology can facilitate this transformation. Internet 
and teleconferencing technologies allow virtual communities to gather and share 
information in real time. Government officials should spend more time setting priorities, 
coordinating communication, supplying technical assistance, and assuring data quality. 
Collecting more information from more sources will require more analytical capability to 
prevent information overload.  The first step in designing an intelligence system to fight 
terrorism while protecting openness and privacy is to understand what information is 
needed to support each homeland security challenge. For example, to protect America's 
borders, we need more complete information about people and goods entering the 
country. To detect potential terrorist threats within the United States, we need to enhance 
traditional investigative techniques by cross-referencing databases such as airline 
reservation records, phone logs, and credit histories with government law enforcement, 
immigration, and intelligence information. To protect critical infrastructure in areas such 
as agriculture, food, water, public health, emergency services, telecommunications, 
energy, transportation, banking, and finance, we need to map vulnerabilities against 
capabilities of potential terrorists, people who have access to those infrastructures, and 
the means available to carry out effective attacks. To respond to emergencies, we need 
two-way communication in real time between first responders and other officials about 
the extent and nature of the attack, the resources available to respond, and the risk of 
further terrorist action. 
To effectively perform the necessary functions to be successful in completing the 
previously described tasks, capabilities need to be integrated.  Analysts must be able to 
access many different data bases in order to gather information necessary to connect the 
dots.  There are currently thousands of public safety agencies that operate with their own 
records management systems (RMSs) and do not have the ability to access another 
agency’s data base.  Data needs to not only be accessible, but also must be readable.  
How can different systems make sense out of the data?  There must be a common 
language so that data can be interpreted.  Chapter IV will look at the business 
requirements necessary in order to put such an integrated system together.  The basic 
fundamentals of developing an information sharing network will be addressed and how a  
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statewide fusion center can become integrated with a major urban area terrorism early 
warning system.  Without the proper technological and business requirements in place an 
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IV. INFORMATION SHARING ENTERPRISE 
Preventing a terrorist attack requires that Federal, State, local and private sector 
entities have an effective information sharing and collaboration capability to ensure that 
they can seamlessly collect, process, analyze and disseminate information regarding 
threats, vulnerabilities and consequences in support of prevention, response and 
consequence management efforts.43  Currently in Wisconsin, there are many public safety 
agencies operating on different systems.  The difference in data structures and the lack of 
interoperability makes it nearly impossible to effectively share information.  A major 
concern lies within licensing agreements that use off the shelf software products that 
simply are incompatible with one another.  This causes a significant hindrance to 
information sharing.44 The terrorist attack of 9/11 has clearly spelled out the need for all 
public safety agencies to correct the inadequacies and barriers that impede information 
sharing, so that future tragedies could be prevented.  States need to put a system in place 
using available technology that will allow different agencies to access and disseminate 
information. 
During a February 2003 speech, President Bush exemplified the importance of 
information sharing so that those working on the front line can prevent terrorism.45 
Information sharing is the process by which raw data are collected and disseminated 
among relevant agencies or individuals. Information sharing helps inform public safety 
officials of the terrorist threats they face so that they can take the appropriate measures to 
address those threats. Jurisdictions can employ local law enforcement agencies, fusion 
centers, or information sharing networks as mechanisms or organizational structures to 
share terrorism-related information. 
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An information sharing network is a structure for directly linking together public 
safety agencies and entities to facilitate the flow of information and foster cooperation 
among them. In an information sharing network, public safety agencies directly share 
terrorism-related information with each other. Officials from these agencies act as nodes 
within the network, transmitting terrorism-related information from their own agency to 
local police and to other agencies for which this information would be relevant. In an 
information sharing network, law enforcement agencies and fusion centers do not serve 
as the single, centralized hubs for information management. However, they still play a 
vital role as nodes that are capable of producing and disseminating analyzed intelligence 
throughout the network. 
Justice systems are best integrated when users access the data where they reside, 
in a decentralized framework with a common architecture that connects legacy systems, 
to speed deployment and reduce associated time and costs. In an integrated system, 
authorized users can manipulate data and create a meaningful profile of an individual or 
situation based on information from law enforcement agencies, the courts, prisons, 
drivers' licenses, parole officers, prosecutors, public defenders and so forth. 
Criminal incidents, sentencing orders and citations can be filed, read and accessed by 
relevant parties within one architecture. Mobile access to databases can provide relatively 
accurate assessments of crime and criminal locations; quick access to prior criminal 
records in neighboring counties, cities or states; and essentially the ability to create a 
holistic picture of a criminal or event within minutes. 
The challenge for Wisconsin is to integrate the major information providers (State 
Agencies, Federal Agencies and Local Records Management Systems or RMSs) in a way 
that does not require Gateway users to repeatedly search or query each source looking for 
information.  The concept of creating a justice information sharing system is essential in 
solving the problem.  In the State of Wisconsin, the major criminal justice information 
providers are: 
• The Department of Transportation (DOT) provides information on 
vehicles and citations.  
• The Health Alert Network(HAN) is a gateway to public health information  
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• The Consolidated Court Automation Program (CCAP) provides 
information from the courts  
• Time provides Wisconsin criminal histories and links to Federal Agencies  
• Protect provides information from the District Attorneys  
• Corrections are in the process of acquiring an RMS system.  
• Local RMSs provide information about Law Enforcement activity at the 
local level.  
• The Department of justice hot files and criminal history repository. 
 
Integration of these data sources relying only on a query/response approach is 
difficult or impossible, because data sources are poorly organized offering hundreds or 
thousands of data fields of potential interest and sequential querying of each data 
provider is time consuming and feasible only in high profile cases. 
Using the Global Justice eXtensible Markup Language Data Model, (GJXML) 
various agencies would be able to obtain valuable information.  This technology would 
clearly improve access to justice information across boundaries.  Wisconsin information 
sharing would incorporate a statewide implementation of GJXDM. 
The GJXDM provides multiple ways to describe relationships between objects, 
such as a person who owns a vehicle, a person who has a residence, a person or 
organization has contact information, etc.  It is designed to be used as a model for the 
exchange of information.  GJXML allows disparate organizations to talk seamlessly 
without having to understand each others internal systems.  This technology describes 
how data for a certain type of exchange is formatted using schemas; xml files detailing 
the types of data that can be used and how it must be structured.46  Figure II shows the 
traditional point to point model where several different systems are mapping repeatedly 
in order to obtain data.  The canonical standard approach shows a central hub that 
multiple users can access to obtain information and data. 
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Figure 2.   Communication Exchange Model  
 
The GJXML model is based on a common language that acts as a catalyst in 
defining common terms between disparate systems.  The data dictionary is the data 
model's underpinning structure. It is, in effect, a spreadsheet containing identification of 
data elements, and the meanings or definitions of those data elements, all of which are 
unique. The data model builds relationships between the data elements, and the result, in 
simple terms, is that disparate systems connect via the unique identifiers.47  Much of the 
data shared between justice and public safety agencies, or even justice and transportation 
agencies, is similar, so each organization needs to define and represent those elements in 
the same manner for interoperability to take place, otherwise fragmentation can occur.  In 
addition, the federal government has initiated a national data dictionary and national 
reference model in the form of an XML schema that can be integrated with state and local 
systems too.48 
Information sharing would be designed to connect information seekers in the 
criminal justice system with the major information provides (Law Enforcement, District 
Attorneys, The Courts and Corrections) using Web Services(WS) and WS – Security 
running over the State of Wisconsin Enterprise Security Systems (ESS), Enterprise 
Services Bus (ESB) and the Enterprise Directory (EDIR).                                                  
47 Jim McKay, "XMLout of the Shadows," Government Technology (June 2005): 18. 
48 Paul Embley, "Information Technology Standards," Police Chief (June 2004): 37. 
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B. FUNDAMENTALS USED IN DEVELOPMENT 
The Wisconsin version of the Justice XML Reference Model would use three 
broad functional categories: (1) Federated Directories; There are currently multiple 
directories throughout law enforcement in the State of Wisconsin.  A federated directory 
structure allows these multiple directories to be viewed as if they were one directory. In a 
Web services environment, federated directories can be implemented as a Web service 
where each organization provides a Web service that identifies and authenticates its 
users. The service would also identify the user's role within the organization; (2) 
integration servers, to integrate the local RMS systems; there is a need for software that 
enables one application to communicate with another on an ongoing basis.  The 
foundation of an integration server is a message transport system; (3) Web Portal; The 
Web portal is a site that provides a variety of services include searching, news, 
directories, email, discussion groups, document repositories, data repositories, link 
repositories and publish/subscribe services.  
The World Wide Web is more and more used for application to application 
communication. The programmatic interfaces made available are referred to as Web 
services.  Web services provide a standard means of interoperating between different 
software applications, running on a variety of platforms and/or frameworks. Web services 
are characterized by their great interoperability and extensibility thanks to the use of 
XML, and they can then be combined in a loosely coupled way in order to achieve 
complex operations. Programs providing simple services can interact with each other in 
order to deliver sophisticated added-value services. 
The Enterprise Services Bus (ESB) will also play a primary role in information 
sharing and interoperability.  ESB is open-standards-based messaging middleware that 
provides secure interoperability among enterprise applications via extensible markup 
language (XML), Web-services interfaces and standardized rules-based routing of 
documents. Because sharing data through ESB doesn’t depend on the data format, 
application and data integration is much easier to achieve.  The intention is that the ESB 
would support a secure gateway through which hundreds of state and local law 
enforcement officials could log on to the system and thus be able to share vital 
information with one another.  The key advantages of an ESB are; they are a faster and 
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cheaper accommodation of existing systems, they have increased flexibility and are easier 
to change as technology changes, they are standards based and they have scales from 
point solutions to enterprise wide deployment.49 
It is clear that there will be a high level of dependency on the information systems 
built to support the activities of information sharing.  Compromise of these systems either 
in terms of loss or inaccuracy of information or unauthorized individuals gaining access 
to it can be extremely costly to the enterprise.  Security breaches can occur; therefore the 
system must be protected. 
Security of the enterprise protects it from unauthorized attempts to access 
information or interfere with its operation.  It is concerned with: (1) confidentiality; that 
information is disclosed only to users authorized to use it; (2) integrity; that information 
is modified only by users who have the right to do so and only in authorized ways.  
Information should only be transferred between intended users an in intended ways; (3) 
accountability, users should be accountable for their security relevant actions.  A 
particular case of this is non-repudiation, where responsibility for an action cannot be 
denied; (4) Availability; use of the system cannot be maliciously denied to authorized 
users.50 
Privacy is also a part of the integrity and security of an information sharing 
enterprise.  Therefore, it is imperative that any information sharing enterprise incorporate 
a “privacy Policy”.  With all this new technology come concerns by the public over the 
use, or potential misuse of personal information contained within these systems. As 
agencies begin to take advantage of information sharing and the technology that allows 
them to do so, their responsibility for assuring proper use and dissemination of this 
information is paramount.51  The administrators of such a system must have a process in 
place the captures the essence of privacy.  Upon adopting a statement of purpose the 
policy should consider at a minimum the following; 
                                                 
49 William Welsh, "Wisconsin Rides Enterprise Bus to Savings," Washington Technology, July 5, 
2004, http://www.washingtontechnology.com// (accessed September 2, 2005). 
50 Lee Rech, "Patch Management," IT Security Magazine (March 2005): 7. 
51 Paul F. Kendall, Justice Information Privacy Guideline (Washington D.C.: National Criminal 
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• What is the purpose of the information sharing system? 
• Do information collection practices mirror the system’s purpose? 
• What are the goals trying to achieve through interagency information 
sharing? 
• Are there limits to interagency sharing or access provided by jurisdictional 
laws or guidelines? 
• What is the standard for determining accuracy of data and modification? 
• In an integrated system, who is ultimately responsible for data quality? 
 
These are just some of the questions that should be answered to ensure the 
security and integrity of information sharing enterprise systems.52 
There are several fundamental principles that guide the development and 
implementation of an information sharing enterprise.  Technical solutions must be driven 
by business requirements.  Information must be captured at the originating point rather 
than reconstructed later.  In addition, information is only captured once and should be 
reused, rather than recaptured when needed again.  Justice organizations within the 
enterprise should have the right to design, operate and maintain systems to meet their 
own operational requirements. As with any other network participants must meet agreed 
upon data, communication, security requirements and standards in order to participate. 
Security and privacy must be priorities in the development of integrated justice 
capabilities and in the determination of standards.  As indicated earlier, there must be a 
privacy policy adopted.53  Due to the singular consequences of decision making 
throughout the justice enterprise, establishing and confirming the positive identity of the 
record subject is crucial. 
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C. SYSTEM TECHNOLOGY 
There are several operating requirements for integrated justice information 
sharing that have significant implications for infrastructure development and statewide IT 
architecture. 
Operational requirements 
• Ability to query and retrieve information from relevant information 
systems throughout the justice system, and other relevant governmental 
agencies, without prior specific knowledge of the detailed structure of 
these systems.  
• Ability to electronically send/transmit information from operational 
information systems in one agency/jurisdiction for inclusion in another 
(recipient) information system.  
• Ability to request information from one system and incorporate it into 
another system without human intervention.  
• Ability to be notified of critical events, actions and transactions on a case, 
person or event.  
• Ability to trigger events and other actions in other systems based on 
actions taken in operational justice information systems.  
• Ability to transmit electronic documents between organizations, including 
tagged data elements.  
• Ability to ascertain or confirm the identity of an individual and link 
identity to documents, decisions and other official actions.  
• Ability to determine the current legal status of an individual.  
• Ability to manage and process the collection and distribution of fines, 
fees, costs, restitution, assessments, and other types of monetary accounts 
across organizational boundaries.  
• Ability to discover agencies which have information concerning a 
specified individual (raises questions concerning need for centralized 
indices or search engines operating against "exposed" portions of criminal 
justice databases) 
• Ability to discover the information needed to address a message to the 
criminal justice agency having jurisdiction in a specific geographic 
locale.54 
These universal operating requirements for integrated justice information sharing 
are broadly applicable and representative of integrated justice initiatives nationally.  The 
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list should not be viewed as all inclusive, but should be a thorough representation of what 




Figure 3.   WIJIS Gateway 
 
The above diagram is modeled after the Wisconsin justice information-sharing 
concept.  It shows administrative users establishing policies, rights, and privileges.  The 




information sharing partner systems for detailed information.  The user than subscribes to 
content updates on the information sharing GJXML objects of interest, using extended 
portal functions. 
The efficient sharing of data among justice entities is at the very heart of modern 
public safety and law enforcement.  It is the essential core of preventing another terrorist 
attack on our homeland.  The technology is available through the use of GJXML, Web 
Services and the use of Enterprise Security Buses.  It is imperative that each state moves 
forward with an information sharing model that adopts the national requirements so that 
vital information can be shared by all users. 
Information sharing should extend beyond just law enforcement to all public 
safety agencies.  The administrators of an information sharing enterprise must work with 
leaders from with the public safety community incorporating the necessary requirements 
to maintain a beneficial enterprise.  The information gateway should be open to agency 
participation regardless of agency size, records management vendor or access to the 
enterprise regardless of whether they choose to share information with the Gateway.  The 
Gateway should be built on open standards that allow for the extraction of data from any 
source.  The Gateway should adopt the global justice reference model to ensure 
participation in a nationwide system of systems network and it should ensure data 
providers maintain control over data being shared. 
The long term goals should be the prevention of terrorism, protect citizen privacy, 
provide real time access to data, maintain the security of the enterprise and allow access 
form wireless devices. 
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V. POLICY ANALYSIS/CONCLUSION 
Previous case studies have suggested options available to Wisconsin for managing 
information flow and the sharing of information to prevent terrorism.  These alternatives 
ranged from creating a single TEW in Milwaukee, to creating one state fusion center or 
creating both and in doing so, create a statewide information sharing network.   This 
broad menu of policy choices suggests the need for a structured process for determining 
which alternative would be most preferred for addressing the existing information sharing 
need in Wisconsin. 
The approach in this thesis is to involve the systematic weighing of benefits and 
drawbacks of each of the alternatives according to a set of selected criteria. These criteria 
will serve as measurement tools that will collectively account for all of the issues and 
considerations anticipated to impact the feasibility of a policy’s implementation and the 
achievement of the policy’s intended outcomes. The different criteria used to evaluate 
each alternative will be assigned varying levels of importance and determine the final 
outcome. 
Seven basic criteria will be used to assess the efficacy of each alternative.  The 
analysis will take into account both practical and evaluative criteria in selecting the 
preferred policy alternative.  The criteria selected are as follows: 
1. Efficiency 
2. Information flow 
3. Jurisdictional authority  
4. Sustainability 
5. Political and legal feasibility 
6. Trust/Relationships 
7. Administration 
The Efficiency (Benefit to Cost Ratio) of a proposed policy measures the extent to 
which a policy maximizes the net benefits of all individuals in the market system, 
including both producers and consumers.  The efficiency criterion assesses the extent to 
which the alternative achieves the policy objective relative to the cost of implementation 
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as compared to other potential options.  Alternatives that rate higher on measures of 
efficiency would be deemed more cost-effective than other competing alternatives.  The 
issue of sustainability refers to the potential for a given policy to sustain its beneficial 
impact beyond the scope of the immediate intervention. More specifically, the question of 
sustainability asks whether the future social or economic environment will continue to 
reap the benefits of a policy once that policy has ended.  Sustainability is of special 
concern when the public policy under scrutiny must design a way to become self 
sustaining within a two year period. 
A major practical concern involving the future promise of a given policy is the 
extent to which the policy receives political support from key decision-makers. Even 
policies with clearly demonstrated benefits might fail to be adopted in the face of strong 
political opposition. The political climate functions as a major policy constraint that will 
strongly influence the feasibility of implementing a given alternative.  In addition to 
political feasibility, existing legal mandates governing information sharing and 
intelligence fusion may serve as constraints to proposed policies. For example, Minnesota 
statutes do not allow for the maintaining of and/or housing of intelligence. 
A measure of jurisdictional authority refers to the extent to which the ability to 
implement the various policy components falls within the realm of authority of the entity. 
The extent of jurisdictional authority directly dictates the types of strategies and activities 
that the governing agency can accomplish and to what extent they can outreach to 
consumers. 
Trust and relationships focus on working in a collaborative effort through a multi-
jurisdictional and multi-disciplined approach.  Agencies come together for the greater 
good and work side by side with one another.  This allows people to build relationships 
through trust.  The cohesiveness of a diversified group that relies on one another to share 
information is fostered.  A new paradigm of need to share begins to form and 
relationships are strengthened in the process. 
Administrative criteria focuses on the relative ease of implementation and cost 
associated with administering a program or policy. Policies that rate highly in satisfying 
evaluative criteria, for example, may be cost-prohibitive to implement or may not be 
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realistic in terms of the administrative effort required to carry out the policy functions 
effectively. For this reason, policies that are designed to operate within an existing 
administrative structure or at low administrative cost would be more practically feasible 
than those requiring major organizational restructuring or high levels of spending. 
 
A. ANALYSIS CRITERIA 
This set of selected criteria provides the necessary tools for determining the most 
preferred policy option with regard to both outcome and feasibility of implementation; 
however, each of the criteria presented may differ with regard to its relative importance 
to the outcome or process.  In other words, one criteria or set of criteria may represent a 
more critical determinant of the policy’s potential value than another, based on some 
value judgment. For this reason, it is useful to assign relative weights to each of the 
criteria in order to establish the degree of influence that the criteria will be allowed to 
exert over the final policy decision. These weights, assigned as fractions adding to “1" 
across the seven criteria, are listed below: 
20 (EF) + .20(IF) + .20(J) .15(S) + .15 (PL) + .05 (T/R) + .05 (A) 
From the seven criteria, the three assigned the highest degree of influence 
(weighting =.20) for the policy outcome, was efficiency, information flow and 
jurisdiction.  The efficiency criteria is viewed as one of the most critical to the policy 
process because it captures the potential for the alternative to maximize net benefits to 
those impacted in the system. The stronger relative rating assigned to this criteria allows 
for the prioritization of maximally efficient approaches to accomplishing policy goals, 
which might be implemented in an “ideal” world unconstrained by practical limitations, 
such as political environment or administrative concerns.  The second criteria, viewed 
equally important, is one of the direct outcomes of the policy, information flow.  The 
stronger the potential to reduce stovepipping and share information with others the more 
ideal the outcome.  The third criteria viewed as a top tier is jurisdiction.  The larger the 
jurisdiction and the more consumers they serve the stronger the rating. 
The second tier in terms of influence was comprised of both the sustainability and 
the political and legal feasibility criteria (weighting = 0.15).  Sustainability received a 
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slightly lower weighting based on the argument that it would only be central to the policy 
process in the face of strong pressure to eliminate the legislation that finances 
preparedness program activities through Grants & Training (G&T). Within G&T’s 
current policy environment, funding to support the information sharing program are 
assessed yearly and each program is a two year program.  In addition, the current trend 
does not suggest any immediate demand to halt funding legislation. Nevertheless, it has 
been assigned a high relative rating in order to reflect the philosophy of the G&T 
preparedness program, which emphasizes the development of sustainable funding 
through other means. 
Political and legal feasibility also received a high weight indicating the 
importance of political support to successful adoption and implementation of policies.  
Without the support of the Governor’s office and the state legislature, future 
sustainability would clearly be an uphill battle.  However, having the support of key 
players is vital to the long term success of the policy. 
The third tier is composed of the remaining two of the practical criteria for 
assessing policy preferences, each assigned an equal weighting of 0.05.  This tier includes 
measures of trust and building relationships and administrative burden. The criteria were 
prioritized slightly lower than the practical criteria of sustainability and political and legal 
feasibility, and are considered to be both desirable and necessary for successful 
implementation.  Trust and building collaborative relationships is essential for 
information sharing to succeed. 
 
B. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
The approach for assessing the optimal policy alternative, or package of policy 
options, involves the development of a simple process for evaluating each option 
according to a uniform set of criteria.  The method of evaluating the alternatives involves 
the creation of both a qualitative and quantitative alternative criterion (outcomes) matrix, 




against each of the designated criteria.  Each alternative-criterion matrix is structured as a 
table of cells with alternatives listed as row headings and individual criteria listed as 
column headings. 
The qualitative version of the matrix provides a brief description of the projected 
outcome, or likely consequence of each policy, with regard to a given criteria, allowing 
for a straightforward comparison of advantages and drawbacks across alternatives. This 
qualitative discussion of each alternative will be used as the basis for creating a 
quantitative matrix, where a numeric rating is assigned to each cell in the table as a 
quantitative measure how the alternative fares on each criterion. This quantitative 
measure will be based on a four-point scale with point values ranging from Very Strong, 
indicating the policy is optimal in terms of that specific criterion, to Very Weak, 
indicating the policy fails to satisfy the criteria in any aspect. The following table 
provides a key for interpreting the range of ratings for each proposed criteria. 
 
Key for Interpreting Criteria Rating Scale 
 
Interpretation of Ratings 
1- Very Strong 
2- Strong 
3- Weak 
4- Very Weak 
 
0.20 (EF) + 0.20(IF) + 0.20(J) 0.15(S) + 0.15 (PL) + 0.05 (T/R) + 0.05 (A) 
 
Interpretation of Ratings – TEW Policy Option 
Criteria 1. Very Strong 2. Strong 3. Weak 4. Very Weak 
Efficiency  X   
Information flow   X  
Jurisdictional    
Authority 
  X  
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Sustainability  X   
Political & Legal  
Feasibility 
 X   
Building Trust   X  
Administration  X   
 
Table 1.   TEW Policy Option 
 
TEW Policy Option = 0.40 + 0.60 + 0.60 + 0.30 + 0.30 + 0.15 + 0.10 = 2.45 
 
0.20 (EF) + 0.20(IF) + 0.20(J) 0.15(S) + 0.15 (PL) + 0.05 (T/R) + 0.05 (A) 
 
Interpretation of Ratings – Fusion Center Policy Option 
Criteria 1. Very Strong 2. Strong 3. Weak 4. Very Weak 
Efficiency  X   
Information flow  X   
Jurisdictional 
Authority 
 X   
Sustainability  X   
Political & Legal 
Feasibility 
X    
Building Trust  X   
Administration  X   
 
Table 2.   Fusion Center Policy Option 
 







0.20 (EF) + 0.20(IF) + 0.20(J) 0.15(S) + 0.15 (PL) + 0.05 (T/R) + 0.05 (A) 
 
Interpretation of Ratings – Fusion Center & TEW Network Policy Option 
Criteria 1. Very Strong 2. Strong 3. Weak 4. Very Weak 
Efficiency  X   
Information flow X    
Jurisdictional 
Authority 
X    
Sustainability  X   
Political & Legal 
Feasibility 
X    
Building Trust X    
Administration X    
 
Table 3.   Fusion Center & TEW Policy Option 
 
Information Network Policy = 0.40 + 0.20 + 0.20 + 0.30 + 0.15 + 0.05 + 0.05 = 1.35 
 
C. RECOMMENDATION & CONCLUSION 
The previous tables clearly show that the information-sharing network enterprise 
created by the implementation of a statewide intelligence fusion center in conjunction 
with a local TEW in the largest metropolitan area (Milwaukee) is the best policy option.  
The TEW in itself is weak in the areas of jurisdiction, information flow and building trust 
and relationships.  This is primarily because the TEW although a great concept, is 
functional at the local level.  Wisconsin has over 6 hundred law enforcement agencies 
and hundreds more public safety and first responder agencies.  A single TEW located in 
Milwaukee cannot cover the entire jurisdiction of the state of Wisconsin. The state could 
not require the city of Milwaukee to service the entire state’s needs. Even the slightest 
attempt would not be political conducive to those in elected office. 
The TEW policy option is evaluated as weak on information flow because it can 
not be fluid on its own.  With no state fusion center there is no concrete information flow 
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from the local level to the state and then into the national intelligence community.  A 
TEW would simply work in conjunction with the federal level of government; however, 
there would be no state level participation in the intelligence process.  A stand alone 
TEW cannot build trust and relationships statewide within the public safety community.  
Even though the TEW can accomplish nearly all goals and objectives for information 
sharing, it can only do so on a local level.  A local TEW cannot track trends and readily 
gather information from throughout the rest of the state.  It needs to be integrated with a 
statewide intelligence fusion center.  The TEW concept also does not normally lend itself 
to hard intelligence analysis.  The TEW is more of a support system and provides 
infrastructure assessment, red teaming and playbooks for specific response procedures 
during a crisis. 
The state fusion center concept overall is a more thorough policy option.  The 
statewide fusion center policy option was rated strong in every category except for 
political and legal feasibility where it scored very strong.  In comparison with the TEW 
policy option, the statewide fusion center would have greater jurisdictional authority by 
covering the entire state.  This would provide a better value to the thousands of 
stakeholders that will benefit firm information sharing.  The information flow would be 
more robust because a statewide center would be directly tied into the state’s entire public 
safety community.  The direct result of these to effects would play a significant role in 
allowing the statewide center to foster and build more trust with local jurisdictions which 
will then lead to more information sharing.  The statewide fusion center was rated very 
strong in political feasibility because it has the support of the State Department of Justice, 
Homeland Security Office, Governor’s Office, Department of Military Affairs and 
several additional entities. 
Combining the two policy options into an information sharing network is by far 
the most compressive policy option and the overall recommendation of this thesis. 
In order to proactively participate in the prevention of terrorism it is clear that 
Milwaukee needs a TEW, because the Milwaukee urban area is home to the state’s most 
critical infrastructure and provides a greater percentage of overall intelligence.  The State 
needs to work with the City of Milwaukee in a collaborative effort to leverage resources 
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to provide workable intelligence information to users throughout the State.  Milwaukee, a 
major urban area as defined by the Urban Area Security Initiative should move forward 
with a TEW and upon completion should be interlinked with the state fusion process.  
The city of Milwaukee Police Department and Fire Department has the resources and the 
commitment of both chief’s.  Currently homeland security funding and UASI funding is 
available to purchase equipment and cover any start up costs. A scaled-down version of 
the LA TEW would be cost effective and allow for future expansion as additional funding 
becomes available.  The combined policy option was rated very strong in every category 
and strong in efficiency and sustainability.  In taking these two criteria together, the 
primary reason for the ranking is simply the start up cost of the combined policy option 
and sustainability of both entities are more expensive than either the TEW or stand alone 
fusion center policy options.  Table 4 shows the yearly operating cost of the statewide 
fusion center.  The yearly budget was constructed using the actual true cost of each 
category.  A similar table would have to be created to capture the yearly operating cost of 
a TEW for Milwaukee. 
 
Item Number Cost 
Personnel   
Analysts 5 $ 266,455 
Agents 4 $ 352,780 
Operational   
Phone   $ 8,862 
Postage/Shipping 4 $ 2,000 
Promotional Items  $ 2,500 
Computers/Software  $ 6,500 
Building   
Lease 1 $ 108,612 
Alarm Monitoring  $ 1,100 
Satellite News Feeds                             1                     $ 1,300 
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Miscellaneous  $31,500 
TOTAL PER YEAR   $ 781,609 
Table 4.   Wisconsin Fusion Center Annual Budget 
 
Although it would initially begin out as a small operation, future funding would 
allow TEW expansion.  The resources to begin operations would consist of police, fire & 
EMS and public health.  The TEW concept is flexible and allows for expansion.  Long 
term, the TEW will be able to provide more products for the UASI area and the support 
will grow causing more agencies to commit resources and/or personnel to the TEW.  A 
governance structure would be put in place to have administrative oversight over the 
TEW.  The group will be responsible for the operational policies of the TEW.  A 
governance structure will create a supported environment that frames the ability for the 
TEW to function and operate, assign task, allocate and manage resources and develop 
and enforce policy.  In addition, the governance structure shall ensure an equal 
opportunity for all participating agencies and users to have ownership in the decision 
making process. 
The TEW concept allows for inter-agency coordination.  On a national level, the 
intelligence community must evolve and truly become both a top down and bottom up 
information sharing enterprise.  The local TEW feeds information into the state fusion 
center and the statewide fusion center pushes that information up to the National Counter 
Terrorism Center (NCTC).  The proper dissemination of information from the federal 
level would provide intelligence to the state fusion center and the state will disseminate 
that information to the local police.  Fostering a collaborative environment builds trust 
among participating entities, strengthens partnerships and provides individual as well as 
collective ownership in the mission and goals of the TEW.  The purpose of collaboration 
is to increase capacity, communication and continuity of service while decreasing 
duplication. 
Area public safety agencies will be encouraged to participate in the TEW and 
Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center (WSIC) Terrorism Liaison Offer (TLO) and 
private sector entities, the Infrastructure Liaison Officer (ILO) programs.  Both programs 
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will ensure that the TEW and WSIC have a trained primary point of contact that can be 
counted on to actively work with both entities.  Terrorism Liaison Officers develop and 
maintain critical human networks throughout the community that can provide early 
warning to terrorist activity.  Infrastructure Liaison Officers provide the same function, 
only they are employed in the private sector.  ILOs help build the public-private 
partnership within the intelligence community. 
The TEW system will be more than the one-time collection of law enforcement 
and/or terrorism related intelligence and will allow for a constant on-going process that 
involves the delineation of roles and responsibilities, the creation of requirements, and the 
collection, blending, analysis, timely dissemination and reevaluation of critical data, 
information and intelligence derived from a variety of sources.  A TEW will leverage 
information and intelligence through processes and systems to support the rapid 
identification of patterns and trends that may be indicative of an emerging threat 
condition. 
Although the primary emphasis of intelligence fusion is to identify, deter and 
respond to terrorism related incidents, threats and risks, a fundamental benefit to the 
Milwaukee urban area, tribal and local entities is that it will support ongoing efforts to 
address non-terrorism related issues such as; allowing for better identification and 
forecast of emerging crime, public health and quality of life trends and supporting law 
enforcement proactive, risk based, community focused problem solving activities. 
The WSIC state fusion center will be linked to the Milwaukee (UASI-TEW) and 
the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).  The statewide fusion center will serve as a 
central hub for information sharing and directly link into the NCTC and HSOC, thus 
leveraging national intelligence.  A strategy for sharing information nationwide is 
creating a network.  The information sharing network is essential to preventing another 
terrorist attack.  A process will be initiated that will allow for the proper dissemination of 
intelligence and information sharing throughout Wisconsin. 
The strategy canvas is both a diagnostic and an action framework for building a 
compelling valued innovative approach.  Its primary purpose is it captures the current 
state of action in the known market space.  This allows you to understand where the 
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current system is investing time and resources and what its products, services and 
delivery are.  The primary problems of traditional information sharing are listed below, 
followed by the advantages of an information sharing network and collaborative 
information sharing. 
 
Traditional Approach Problems  
• Stove piping 
• Intelligence community culture 
• Need to know 
• Failure to share 
• Poor information flow 
• Poor relationships and reputation 
 
Information Sharing Network Advantages 
• Need to share philosophy 
• Collaborative 
• Information flow 
• Building of trust  
• Relationships 
• Reputation 
• Overarching jurisdictional authority 
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Figure 4.   Traditional versus Information Sharing Networks Canvas 
 
A comparison of the traditional versus networked method of intelligence sharing 
is illustrated in Figure 4.  The categories of difference are as follows: collection; more 
enhanced via the information sharing network than traditional methods); culture (multi-
agency and much improved via network compared to traditional, the friction of culture is 
reduced in an information sharing network); stove pipes (virtually eliminated in an 
information sharing network due to cultural shift from need to know to need to share 
attitude); need-to-know (traditional method operates strictly on need-to-know that is not 
conducive to the information sharing network theory, which is based on need-to-share 
and is thus rated much lower in intelligence sharing in the traditional method); 
jurisdiction; (an information sharing network covers the major urban areas and the state 
level.  The network is than integrated into the national intelligence structure); job security 
(personnel in the traditional system feel they must maintain status quo to keep jobs versus 
personnel in the information sharing network in which networking and relationships 
would reduce fear of job security and thus increase perception that job security exists); 
Political feasibility (is enhanced in the information sharing network, there is strong 
66 
support from DHS and state & local government for information sharing and to support a 
methodology that can prevent another 9/11; trust (working closely together with a 
common goal, although from different agencies builds stronger trust factors than 
isolationist/elitist attitude of the traditional system thus, the mutual trust factor is greatly 
improved, coordination and collaboration builds this trust); relationships (relationships 
become stronger in a networked atmosphere, resulting in enhanced sharing, the need to 
share becomes evident in a collaborative environment) – an example is the JTTF, 
although little improvement has been made or at least has not spread nationally; 
reputation (within a networked sharing system it is perceived highly likely that agencies 
will be more forthcoming and not want to bear the brunt of the “agency” that held out in 
event of a scenario similar to 9/11 — cooperation will foster enhanced reputation); need-
to-share (the development of an information sharing network is purely based on need-to-
share intelligence, collaboration and coordination eliminating many barriers compared to 
the Department of Defense-based need-to-know attitude that the intelligence community 
operates under thus, information sharing is greatly enhanced).  The strategy canvas shows 
the added value of an information sharing network. 
 




Traditional Methods                                                         Information Sharing Network 
 
The development and exchange of intelligence is not easy.  Information sharing 
not only requires strong leadership; it also requires the commitment, dedication and trust 
of a diverse group of men and women that agree in the power of collaboration.  The 
ultimate goal is to provide a mechanism where law enforcement , public safety and 
private sector partners can come together with a common purpose and improve the ability 
to safeguard our homeland, state and prevent criminal activity.  TEWs embody the core 
of collaboration and as resources decrease, TEWs will become even more of an effective 
tool to maximize available resources and build trusted relationships.  The fusion process 
should be organized and coordinated on a statewide level between the Milwaukee TEW 
and the statewide fusion center. 
Value 
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States planning to implement a statewide fusion center should learn from those 
states that have already set up and are operating intelligence fusion centers.  A fusion 
center is a physical location where officials receive, process, and analyze all-source 
information and synthesize their analyses into intelligence products for dissemination to 
relevant agencies and officials. Fusion centers can also serve as primary mechanisms for 
information sharing at the state and local levels. Fusion center analysts process and 
analyze information from state and local public safety agencies. The center shares it with 
relevant federal, state, or local agencies. A fusion center also can process information 
from federal sources, determine its relevance within the state or local jurisdiction, and 
disseminate it as necessary.  
The mission of any information sharing network should be to protect the citizens 
and critical infrastructures of the individual state by enhancing and coordinating counter 
terrorism intelligence and other investigative support efforts among local, state and 
federal law enforcement and public safety agencies.  The goal is to prevent terrorism and 
related crimes and play a crucial support role in an all hazards event, thereby providing a 
safe environment for the citizens of that state.  It is imperative to have intelligence and 
investigative priorities.  Information sharing networks should prioritize by utilizing the 
following specific categories: 
• Terrorism and related crimes 
• Threats to critical infrastructure  
• Threats to government and law enforcement officials 
• Transnational organized crime 
• Traditional organized crime 
• Threats to special events  
• Identity theft / Document fraud  
• Narco terrorism  
• Transportation related incidents 
• Major arsons 
• Weapons, alcohol, tobacco 
• Hazmat/WMD related incidents 
• Explosive related incidents 
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• International incidents with potential for local impact 
• Border related crimes 
As more fusion centers begin to start up operations around the U.S. we must make 
sure that they are fully integrated with local TEW’s and the statewide fusion center is 
directly interconnected with the federal intelligence community.  Over time, information 
sharing networks at the state and local level should see expansion not only in the form of 
space, but more importantly in the form of diversified personnel.  An optimum local 
information sharing network in Wisconsin would have personnel from the following 
agencies assigned to the statewide fusion center, this list would include:  
• Wisconsin State Patrol 
• Milwaukee Police Department 
• Madison Police Department 
• Dane County Sheriff’s Office 
• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
• Milwaukee Fire Department 
• Madison Fire Department 
• USDHS Border Patrol 
• USDHS Immigration & Customs Enforcement 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation 
• U.S. Secret Service 
• U.S. Postal inspection Service 
• Wisconsin Department of Corrections 
• Wisconsin Department of Public Health (DHFS) 
• Wisconsin Department of Agriculture 
• Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources 
• Wisconsin Attorney General Office 
• Wisconsin Department of Military Affairs 
• USDHS Intelligence & Analysis 
 
Wisconsin and additional states that have fusion centers or those that are in the 
conceptual stage for a statewide intelligence center and/or a local TEW should reach out 
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to the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and become partners in 
information sharing.  Milwaukee, Wisconsin has a HIDTA office and they should be 
integrated into the information sharing network.  The HIDTA program provides 
additional federal resources to those areas to help eliminate or reduce drug trafficking and 
its harmful consequences. Law enforcement organizations within HIDTAs assess drug 
trafficking problems and design specific initiatives to reduce or eliminate the production, 
manufacture, transportation, distribution and chronic use of illegal drugs and money 
laundering.  One of the key priorities of the Program is to assess regional drug threats and 
facilitate coordination between federal, state and local efforts; to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of drug control efforts to reduce or eliminate the harmful 
impact of drug trafficking.  Figure 5 shows the HIDTAs located throughout the U.S. that 





Southwest Border Regions 
Figure 5.       High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas 
 
The Milwaukee HIDTA makes it clear in their mission statement that they apply 
enhanced intelligence processes, a high level of enforcement coordination, and 
                                                 
55 Office of National Drug Control Policy, “High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas,” 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/hidta/index.html. (accessed July 22, 2006).  
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prosecution too substantially and measurably reduce organized drug distribution, drug 
related violent crime, and money laundering, and to reduce the demand for illegal drugs 
within the Milwaukee HIDTA.  The Milwaukee HIDTA would be a great asset to the 
information sharing network in Wisconsin and many other states that are in the process of 
creating and/or operating a fusion center and/or TEW.  
Fusion centers provide a clear link between local and federal public safety 
agencies. This enables fusion centers to coordinate interagency information sharing more 
effectively than could be done with the traditional approach. Fusion centers also take an 
all-source, multidisciplinary approach that facilitates the collection of information from a 
wide range of sources and perspectives.  Fusion centers can be structured differently and 
have different missions and some similar obstacles may have to be overcome through 
different methods.  Fusion centers should support several general principles: 
• States should identify the legal and bureaucratic obstacles to effective 
communications sharing and ensure their state fusion centers are designed 
in way that addresses those obstacles. 
• States should ensure that fusion center officials are familiar with the 
federal privacy regulations governing the use and protection of criminal 
intelligence information and that center operations at a minimum, comply 
with those regulations. 
•  States should ensure that fusion centers are formalized through legislation 
or binding interagency agreements and that their governance structure 
includes representation from all participating agencies. 
• States should determine early in the planning process whether the fusion 
center will have the authority to carry out its own investigations, play 
purely an analytical role, or have both functions. 
• States should ensure the center integrates staff from diverse agencies, 
including public safety, public health, energy, transportation, technology 
and the state national guard.  All agencies need not be a part of an 
intelligence fusion center, but the center should have provisions to 
incorporate liaisons from agencies with homeland security interest. 
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• States should ensure that the site selected for the fusion center is 
bureaucratically neutral, is designed to encourage collaboration, and can 
accommodate analysts from all agencies that are expected to contribute to 
its operations. 
• Early in the process of establishing fusion centers states should identify 
and allocate state resources to complement federal grant money.  This is 
essential to the long term viability of state fusion centers. 
The operation of a fusion center can have several standards be put into place in 
many different ways to achieve the outcomes desired.  However, in order to be successful 
the center should incorporate the following operational guidelines for the effective fusion 
of intelligence and information: 
• Use of common terminology, definitions and lexicon by all entities 
involved. 
• A clear understanding of the links between terrorism-related information 
and non-terrorism related information. 
• Clearly defined intelligence and information requirements from the 
intelligence community that prioritize and guide planning, collection, 
analysis, dissemination, and reevaluation efforts.    
• An all hazards, all crimes approach to defining information collection, 
analysis and dissemination. 
• Reliance on existing information pathways and analytic processes to the 
extent possible. 
• Clear delineation of roles, responsibilities and requirements of each level 
and sector of government involved in the fusion process. 
• A capacity to convert information to operational intelligence. 
• The use of subject matter experts in the analytical process. 
• Extensive and continuous interaction with the private sector and with the 
public. 
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Intelligence fusion centers and terrorism early warning systems provide an 
opportunity for states and locals to break down the informational silos created by 
historical legal and bureaucratic impediments to information sharing.  The intelligence 
reform efforts continuously underway at the federal level are contributing to an 
atmosphere that encourages information sharing.  However, states must also be key 
leaders in this area.  State and local leaders are positioned to mobilize state homeland 
security resources and design truly integrated information sharing networks. 
Despite the federal government making intelligence analysis and information 
sharing a national preparedness priority, to create such an enterprise is challenging.  Turf 
wars will continue to mark the relationship among state and federal agencies; privacy 
issues must be addressed; states must operate, at least for the time being with only limited 
national standards for the design and operation of  fusion centers and TEWs; and 
restrictions on the use of federal homeland security funding, necessitate state funds for 
long term operations.   
 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH ISSUES 
Information sharing networks will continue to grow through the development of 
statewide fusion centers and local urban area terrorism warning systems.  The success of 
such endeavors is currently unknown.  The question becomes how can the success of 
these networks be measured?  Future research should look at the fusion center 
information sharing concept and whether or not the intelligence centers put into place 
around the country have been successful or not and to what level have they been 
successful.  There needs to be a consistent and systematic series of metrics that measure 
the success and/or failure of fusion centers.  At this time it appears that nearly all 
jurisdictions exploring the intelligence fusion center and/or TEW concepts are not 
focusing on having an effective system in place that measures the outcomes and success 
of operating an information sharing entity.  In addition, the issue of security clearances 
also needs to be addressed.  The current military model should be studied and research 
conducted with stakeholder input on how to effectively solve the issue of security 
clearances.  The current process is ineffective that is administered by the FBI and as the  
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lead domestic intelligence agency, it is a conflict of interest to be the collectors of 
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